Challenging Authoritarianism Part 2: Authoritarianism Today


(slow music) (overlapping chattering) – All right, good afternoon, everybody. Thanks for coming. Thanks for those of you who
attended the first session, and are here for the second session. Let me introduce myself briefly, and then a couple of thank yous. So my name is Osamah
Khali, I’m a professor here in the History Department,
and the organizer of today’s symposium. I want to thank the previous panelists, but also Hava and Lindsey,
who you see circulating, who are doing a phenomenal
job, couldn’t do without them. And I already thanks our co-sponsors, but I’ll thank them again just in general for sponsoring today’s event. So the panel today,
the second panel builds on the discussion from this morning. As I’m sure many of you
know, there’s hardly a day that goes by without a reference to rising authoritarianism, or even fascism around
the globe and at home. And as with our earlier
discussion in part one, the discussion of
authoritarianism today will offer a trans-national
exploration of this topic, and we’re gonna examine
efforts from above and below to challenge authoritarianism, as well as some of the different stories and strategies involved in doing that. So I’m pleased to introduce
our distinguished panel from, all from Syracuse faculty, from here and the Newhouse School. So we’re gonna start
with Dimitar Gueorguiev, who’s an Assistant Professor
of Political Science at Syracuse University,
whether due to nostalgia or stubbornness, Dimitar tells
us he originally comes from, hails from Bulgaria, one of
the several Leninist states that collapsed at the
end of the 20th century that we talked about in the morning, and he focuses his attention
on the one big state that survived, the
People’s Republic of China, and its prospects for
doing so into the future. Dimitar’s most current research
concerns the intersection between Leninist-controlled institutions and modern technology in the PRC. Azra Hromadžić, how did
I do, was it all right? All right.
(Azra laughs) I was, I was doing, okay, all right. I was really proud of myself for a second. – [Azra] Great job, great job. – All right, everybody but just my name, it’s okay, is an Associate Professor in the Department of
Anthropology here at Syracuse. She has research interests
in the anthropology of international policy in the context of state-making and post-war
Bosnia and Herzegovina. Her book, Citizens of an Empty Nation: Youth and State-Making in
Post-War Bosnia and Herzegovina is an ethnographic investigation of internationally directed
post-war intervention policies in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the response of local
people to these policy efforts. She’s also co-editor of
Care Across Distance: Ethnographic Explorations
of Aging and Migration. Christine Mehta is a
human rights investigator, formally with Amnesty International and Physicians for Human Rights. She has reported on a range of issues, from national security,
conflict, and war crimes to extractive industries, medical ethics, and criminal justice, she teaches classes at the intersection of journalism and human rights at the Newhouse School. Latif Tas is Assistant Professor and Marie Curie Global
Fellow at the Maxwell School and at SOAS, in the University of London, where he obtained his PhD, I’m sorry, obtained his PhD in law from Queen Mary University of
London, and he’s been writing on a comparative politics
social legal practices, gender, and diaspora mobilization,
peace and conflict resolution in Europe and the Middle
East with special reference to the Kurds and Turks. He’s the author of Legal
Pluralism in Action: Dispute Resolution and the
Kurdish Peace Committee. And finally, Brian Taylor, he’s Professor and Chair of the Political
Science Department. He’s written three books,
and his most recent book is The Code of Putinism,
which was published last year. So please join me in welcoming our guests. (audience applauds) So Brian, can we start with
you, just to kind of pick up on the previous panel? So we ended on kind of
a somewhat hopeful note, right, with the end of the Cold War, but the Soviet Union
obviously doesn’t survive. And so it dissolves within two years, after the fall of the Berlin Wall. Can you talk about that,
and how that sets up in a way authoritarianism today in Russia? – Sure. Thanks, Osamah, so. When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, they already had made some
steps towards liberalization and democratization with a much
freer press by the late ’80s and early ’90s than had
been there previously, a series of elections at both the national and regional level in 1989 and 1990, new freedom to protest, new
freedom in the media, et cetera. And I think the late ’80s, early ’90s was probably the period of greatest euphoria about the prospects for democratization around the world, after the collapse of communism in Central and Eastern Europe and Eurasia. And if we look at sort
of both cross-national and cross-temporal trends
in democratization, the early to mid ’90s is
kind of the high point, and it kind of peaked there,
and it’s been fairly stable. If you look at ratings about the number of free or partly free
countries around the world, it’s been somewhat stable, with a bit of a slight decline over the last decade. And the trends in that part of the world are somewhat similar, in that all of the
countries at least announced an intention to democratize. Some of them had no
intention to do so at all, and never really became democratic, countries like Uzbekistan or Turkmenistan, for example, others did embrace democracy and succeed in democratizing,
to a large extent, most obviously here are
the three Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. And then if we look at
the, the other states in the region, we see
divergent tendencies. Some countries like Georgia, like Armenia, like Ukraine and Moldova, like Kyrgyzstan, are what Freedom House would call sort of partly free countries. They have a mix of democratic
and authoritarian elements, and then we have countries more down towards the authoritarianism
end of the spectrum, such as Russia, Belarus,
Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, et cetera. So in terms of Russia, in some senses, it was
seen as perhaps a good bet for democratization,
simply because the society, unlike the society that existed when the Soviet Union was
founded was highly urban, highly literate, highly educated, and had some of those sort of basic social tendencies that sometimes go along with more open political systems. And in the ’90s, they struggled to create stable institutions,
that by the end of the 1990s, were seen as somewhat weak,
but still offering quite a bit of pluralism and liberalism,
and probably most notably, when they had elections
in the 1990s in Russia, no one knew who was gonna win in advance. That obviously is not the case anymore, and after Vladimir Putin
became president in 2000, there’s been a fairly
consistent trajectory, and a more authoritarian direction. We now know who’s going
to win the elections long before they happen, the space for alternative political parties, alternative opposition
movements is quite restrictive, although they do have
some space to organize. So when people talk about the tendency towards authoritarian
around the world, Putin is often sort of number one, two, or three on the list of sort of exhibit A, and this sometimes leads
to a broader discussion about whether there’s kind of an authoritarian international, where they all work together to try and spread authoritarianism,
and I think I’ll leave that issue to further in the discussion. – Thank you, so I want
to turn, Azra, to you, and we’ll get your presentation set up. But the other story at the end of ’89, and really kind of as
we get into the ’90s, it was touched on, is about
the clash of Yugoslavia that kind of sets up your research, so hoping you could talk
a little bit about that. – [Azra] I need to guide
the video, so (mumbles). (Azra mumbles) This one?
– Something. – Just push, oh, okay,
can you hear me okay? When I was invited to
come to join this panel, I asked myself, why, why was I invited? I didn’t do authoritarianism,
but then now I know, because, it’s because Osamah
wanted to say my last name in public, so.
(audience laughs) And also, we needed to add some accents to this event, so here I am. So I’m just very quickly, and we agreed in our exchanges that putting a map up, when it comes to Yugoslavia,
it’s always a good thing. So here I am with the
map of, very colorful, six former Yugoslav
republics, from Slovenia, all the way northwest, all the way down to Macedonia in southeast,
so the former Yugoslavia, and this is the second Yugoslavia, not going to talk about the first one, no time for that one. So the second Yugoslavia
lasted between ’43 and ’91, it was a federation of six republics, and it’s kind of well-known in the world for its famous president, Josip Broz Tito, who is sometimes described as dictator, and sometimes he’s seen as a savior, it depends on who you’re
talking to in the region. It was, as I said, a
federation of six republics, from Slovenia to Croatia,
Bosnia, Herzegovina, Serbia, with two autonomous
regions, Kosovo and Vojvodina, Montenegro and Macedonia. One of the main postulates
of this regime was the notion of (speaking in foreign language), meaning brotherhood and unity, that all ethnic groups in Yugoslavia should peacefully coexist, intermix, and nurture the notion of intermarriage, well, kind of intermarriage policy was, was not always consistent, but. And cross-ethnic affiliation,
and this was done and delivered and taught in schools, and the product of this regime, and I’m happy to talk about that, through schools and the army, which was compulsory for
all males in the country. Another thing that Tito is famous for, and when I teach a class in the Balkans, my students always say, more Tito, they’re just fascinated that high schools in this country don’t teach about Tito, is that Tito was also the head of the Non-Aligned Movement,
together with the Nehru and Nasser that brought together
120 developing countries in the world that didn’t want to side with either West, the
US or Russia during the, US’s side during the Cold War. Bosnia, Yugoslavia was, in some accounts, according to some
accounts, and this is very, connect very beautifully
to the previous panel, was seen in some, in
many people’s eyes as one that, the best positioned
to transition to, peacefully, to peace and democracy, among all Eastern European countries. Well, if you follow CNN in 1990s, it didn’t go that way,
there are many reasons why people say this happened. The most popular account is to say, well, you know, Tito didn’t really succeed to keep nationalism down,
nationalism was bubbling, once he dies, nationalism explodes. I think that’s a very simplistic way to look at what happened, we see there’s a larger
global restructuring. Yugoslavia faced the huge
economic crisis in the ’80s, we heard about workers protests, this was a very common
occurrence in Yugoslavia. And, you know, nationalism
was part of the landscape, but it was not the
dominant or the only story. This was a very modern
war about political power and territory, so Slobodan Milošević, I don’t think he actually
entered the field as a nationalist, he became a nationalist. He was mobilizing the
nationalist tendencies, but he didn’t come to
politics as a nationalist. So Bosnia is something I was asked to talk a little bit more about, was one of those Yugoslav republics that was seen as the one
that cannot witness the war, because it’s so intermixed. Well, the war was forceful
unmixing of peoples, and oftentimes now, we
think about the Bosnian war that lasted between ’92 and ’95 as the war between three groups, Bosnian Serbs, Bosnian Croats, and Bosniaks. I think this is, again, a simplification, an ethnicization of the conflict itself. These kinds of visions
of Bosnia are a product of the war, not a cause
of the war, in my opinion. What’s famous about Bosnia is that, in a country that has less
than four million people, and is half the size of Iceland, 104 thousand wives were lost, and two out of four million people were uprooted, which is a horrific thing to experience, but it’s a great thing if
you travel around the world, you have Bosnians to stay
with wherever you go, which I use a lot. The Dayton Peace Agreement
was brought the end to the Bosnian War, and it was signed in a much cooler place than Dayton, Ohio, which is called Paris,
and on December 14, ’95. And what it did in Bosnia is it installed something
called consociational democracy, and it’s a power sharing
regime, which divided a country, which institutionalized
ethnicity on the sub-state level. And what it did is create, from a country that was territorially very
intermixed, it created kind of a, a country where ethnic people, it delivered the vision where
ethnic people are rooted in ethnic territories. So it was divided into the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina,
with 51% of the territory, and Repubika Srpska with 49,
which is largely centralized. Then Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina is divided into 10 cantons, I’m personally from canton one, I
studied in canton seven, and these are also largely
autonomous, and then, three of which are kind of intermixed, the rest of them are
ethnically homogenous. And then there’s Republika
Srpska, with 49% of territory. Then they couldn’t agree
about the Brčko District in the north, and that’s
a self-governing unit. What does this mean, it means hell, in terms of political
organization of the country. You think you have it
hard with one president, try it with three. So it’s a very complicated
constitutional arrangement, where in order to balance
very competing claims from three different
factions during the war that emerged as the only factions that, that couldn’t negotiate
at the end of the war, because opposition was
disabled at the beginning and through the war,
so in order to do that, one nominally central
government was created, with three presidents, who
rotate every eight months, one of them becomes the president. I don’t know who it is
today, to be honest, they rotate every eight months, and they’re elected for four years, three presidents, two
chambers of parliament, and one Council of
Ministers, two entities, one special district, and
10 ethnically-based cantons, all according to ideology of ethnic people rooted
in ethnic territories, what Campbell called famously
enclave multi-ethnicity. You have multi-ethnicity,
but it’s actually everyone in their own little places. State bureaucracy is
massive, it consumes more than 50% of the annual GDP,
gross domestic product, and also, it employs
the majority of people. So as we heard previous,
in the previous panel, these places, in nationalist governments that control them becomes
spaces also of employment and nepotism, and
clientelism, and, you know, if Bosnians are voting for nationalists, it’s not necessarily because
they’re nationalists, it’s because they want a job. And I think I’ll probably
come to this one, but I wanted to say just that in terms of, in terms of this bureaucratic government, it’s so huge, at some
point, you have 13 levels of governance making, which
is ideal for corruption, it’s ideal for all sorts of maneuverings, and, at the same time, it’s making citizens detach
themselves from the state. So even though you have
such a massive state, I claim the state itself is empty. So I hope I can come to
that in a little bit, I want to give the floor to others. But one thing I want to say as an, as an anthropologist is
that my biggest question, and I want, and what this
kind of, one more slide, and then I’ll let the next person talk, Bosnia can be seen as a fragmented and fractured authoritarian state, because the question is
still, what prevented, really, Bosnia from becoming
this democratic state that would, you know,
peacefully transition to democracy and capitalism? One of the political
scientists who is an expert on the region said that
while the old state is old, and I want to say this
because it was mentioned in the previous panel, as
well, the old regime never did, late Yugoslav communist
establishment mutated into ethno-nationalist cliques. So this, there is a massive
ideological transformation, but actually, when it comes to the nature of the rule, it’s very similar, it’s just fragmented
in the sub-state level, while the benefits of the socialist state, state are all but gone. And this, ironically, is
done under the umbrella of democratization and
peace, and supported by democracy structures, so. I’ll skip that, so this also
allows for all sorts of, you know, corruptions and business deals to take place within
bureaucracy called democracy. The main question is what does it mean to live in this kind of state? This is an anthropological question, how do people deal with this? And I hope I can come to
that later, if there’s time. (audience applauds) – So moving from Azra to a
state that did not dissolve, right, and Dimitar with China. Can you talk a little bit about that? We talked a lot about Tiananmen Square, and just a little bit
after Tiananmen Square, but the persistence in
some of the features of authoritarian rule. Jeremy in the last panel talked about, you know, for about two years afterwards, spring of ’89, was asked
about in questionnaires. So can you just kind of describe
for us how it compares also to Russia and the fragmented authoritarian of Bosnia and Herzegovina in a way? – Okay. I don’t know if I can address
all of those right now, but I’ll definitely come
to them at some point. So these were, first of all, thank you, Osamah, for including me, I’m really happy to be part of this. I think that the first
two speakers gave us a lot of wonderful information, I learned a lot. And so I’m gonna come and
offer kind of a more simple impression of what I think
is happening in China today, and I didn’t really bring
very careful slides, I brought some pictures
that I hope will convey some of the ideas, and you can let me know. So the first one I wanted
to show you is this image of the, the Communist
Party House in Bulgaria, it’s a massive building,
people call it kind of a UFO structure, but
it’s, it’s a massive building that is positioned right in the middle of Bulgaria, in the mountains of the central forest region. If you kind of take a yard stick, and you go in every direction,
it’s basically in the middle of every kind of edge of China, not China, Bulgaria, sorry,
I’m jumping ahead of myself. And it was commissioned in the 1970s, it was built in the 1980s. (background noise drowns out speaker) It was a tremendous
architectural endeavor, it was extremely expensive,
I think at that point, it would have been on the odds
of 30 or 50 million dollars, to build this in a country that really didn’t have
too many resources. And you can tell by the
way it’s structured, it’s a circle, it’s an oval. There’s windows all around, and you can kind of see the whole country, because it’s on top of a mountain peak. And it has an important history, it was a place where the
first kind of serious battle against Ottoman rule happened,
it was also the place where the first kind of Socialist
Party meetings happened. So it has a huge history, but then again, it’s in the middle of the country, it’s far removed from the main cities, which are Sofia and Varna, on kind of, on the opposite coast of the country. And so it was kind of detached, but nevertheless, it was supposed to symbolize this centralization of the Bulgarian Communist
Party, and the fact that it governed the entire country and represented all
groups, all ethnic groups, all religious groups. And it was all part of one
house, one Communist Party. And yet, when you see this image today, what you can, we can obviously tell is, nobody’s been there for
quite a long time, okay? It’s kind of collapsed, the state doesn’t really
do anything to maintain it, tourists go and visit, but
also, you know, artists, movie producers, junkies, whoever it is, skateboarders love to go. So it’s just kind of an empty monument, and I think it symbolizes
kind of what happened with the Bulgarian Communist
Party in the 1980s, is that in its grandeur, in its effort to kind of convey the centralized control, it revealed some of the
emptiness it had as a, as a communist system, as a party system. At the same time as this
monument was being built, this grand house of centralized communist unity was being built,
the grassroots of the Bulgarian Communist Party were
already starting to wither. Communist Party cells across
Bulgaria were little more than kind of clubs of privilege,
and the understanding, by the mid-1980s and into the latter 1980s of what the Bulgarian people
actually thought, or felt, or wanted, was not really
getting through, in my opinion, to the Bulgarian Communist Party. And we have statistics on this, about the Central Communist
Party in Bulgaria, access to information
about public opinion, access to information about
what the public is doing. And even in my own family, I have a story. So my father was a
low-ranking party member who enjoyed kind of the privileges of being a low-ranking party member, and met in party committee meetings, and my mother was a democracy
activist and organizer. So on Saturday, you know, we would go and enjoy kind of the
party pass at the ski area that was reserved only for party members, and on Sunday, my mother
would be organizing sit-ins and street blockages. And nobody really found out about this and complained to my
father until about two or three years into it,
and then by that time, we had already kind of made arrangements to leave the country. But, again, this grandeur of centralized and kind of peripheral vision
that the Communist Party tried to convey with this building really belied a disconnectedness that it
did, had with the people, leading up to 1989 and 1991, later on. So another picture. This is the Great Hall
of the People in Beijing, and you can, you can tell that there’s some
similarities in architecture. Again, it’s a grand building,
it can seat over 30,000 people in its various different conference rooms, and the main hall here. So it has that kind of same
sense of centralized rule, and everybody is part of the process, whether it’s ethnic groups
in Tibet, or in Xinjiang, workers, or intellectuals,
farmers, and artisans. Everybody’s kind of represented in a centralized communist
body, and the question is, I guess for me is, is it disconnected, the way the Bulgarian Communist
Party was in the 1980s? And my, my answer on this is, I’m not gonna give a
complete answer right now, I hope that I’ll be able
to come back and argue with myself a little bit later, but the beginning of my answer was no. I think that what happened in
1989 in China was a reflection of the party kind of under-investing
in grassroots organization and grassroots control. The 1980s, as some of you will know, was a period of rapid
kind of experimentation and liberalization, at
least on the economic side. But it was also a moment of
kind of political uncertainty, as well, and I wasn’t part, I wasn’t here for the whole first
panel, but my impression of what happened in 1989
was as much a kind of, an indication of the communist leadership in Deng Xiaoping being firm,
and convinced about the future, and where the party needed to go, as much as it was about being scared about what was happening
across the country. And the fact that for the first time, you had groups of various interests, of various background coming together and challenging the
regime at the same time. And you have people within
the Chinese Communist Party, even within the top leadership
starting to disagree with a central voice,
and a unified message. I think that that’s what scared them, and the response was an
impressive investment in trying to reconsolidate the party, and reconnect to the, to the public. Here’s another picture, I have only one more picture
after this, then I’ll stop. But this was a picture of a complaint’s bureau
monitoring station in Shanghai. And what you’re seeing here is kind of instantaneous statistics of who’s saying what and where, who’s complaining, where
there’s some sort of issue within one district of the city. And there are people that
are employed to monitor this, along with CCTE cameras, constantly trying to figure out, not only is there some sort of dissident behavior going
on, but is there any sort of tension going on,
social tension, any sort of situation where
authorities need to intervene. And it’s happening instantaneously, and the authorities can
basically micromanage society, to an extent that, you know,
I think the Communist Party in Bulgaria, or every time
Soviet Union would have dreamed to have had in the 1960s and ’70s, and indeed, they were trying to. A lot of the famous computer scientists that we know of today were,
some of them were working with the Soviet kind of intelligentsia
and engineers to try and develop a system where
they could monitory society. But, you know, they were,
they were I think ahead of their time a little bit. But China has this system now,
and it’s going even further. So this is my last image of
what people kind of have started to refer to as digital Lenin-ism, or it’s, it has to do with the social
credit system in China, where basically, every
individual now is gonna carry around them a, what you might
think of as your FICO score, right, of, but it’s not simply based on your behavior financially,
and your credit-worthiness. It’s also, you know, do you
get home too late at night and drink too much, are you too loud, do you drive your car a
little bit recklessly, do you maybe not visit your parents on holidays? And you can ask yourself, well, how would they know this? Well, part of the way this
system is integrated is, not only does this information
get communicated upwards to the government instantaneously, but it’s also communicated
by your friends, by your neighbors, by your colleagues, who are asked and encouraged to rate you, to report on you. This type of, of connection, in that, I don’t mean it in a good sense, but understanding of what’s
going on in society is, I think, a new kind of
authoritarianism that is, that is pretty unique,
at least at this point, to the Chinese case. And I think it’s gonna, it’s contributing to its resilience, but again, I wanted to, I’ll try and argue against
myself a little bit later, so I’ll stop there, thank you. (audience applauds) – Thank you, Dimitar.
(audience applauds) Christine, do you want
to talk about some of, talk about India, and the
features of authoritarianism that you’re observing in India today? – Sure, yeah, and I had a few slides that I can also kind of pop up. Thanks. (Osamah mumbles) Okay, so I’m actually, I’m actually gonna
start a little bit later in my presentation, now
that I’ve heard some of the other speakers go. So I’m gonna talk from a
slightly different perspective, I’m not an academic, I don’t study this from an academic perspective, but I, when I speak on these sorts of things, I tend to speak on it from the perspective of a journalist and a activist. So I spent about four years working in India for Amnesty International, right as the national elections
were happening in 2014, which the national elections now actually just started yesterday in India. So during that time, you know, as somebody who was working kind of in the
civil society space in India, you know, we started to notice
some interesting trends, and just kind of some new
shrinking of civic space that we hadn’t really
experienced in the past. So when I speak on this,
I tend to look at it from, what does civic space
look like around the world? And this is a really
interesting open source project called Civicus, which looks
at the number of attacks that have been perpetrated
against activists and journalists around the world. And so they’ve started doing this in the past couple of years, and it’s really interesting data source to kind of look at, you know, where is civic space being
obstructed around the world? And you can see, in the case of India, you know, we have some
growing obstruction, compared to what this map
looked like 10 years ago. And this is just another chart, looking at kind of the type of, kind of what we call
attacks on civic space. So use of excessive force,
detention of activists, attacks on journalists, and especially legislative
restrictions, which is something that we’ve seen popping up,
especially in South Asia. South Asia leads the world, in terms of placing new
legislative restrictions, especially on the funding of NGO activity in these countries, which has proved, over the past five years,
to become very problematic in India, and has been the subject of international condemnation. So I’m gonna go back to the
beginning here, so yesterday was the start of the 2019
national elections in India, so India has this reputation of being one of the largest democracies
in the world, thriving, pluralistic, you know, the
national elections in India are often called the largest
electoral spectacle in the world. There are about 900 million people that are expected to vote, so, but what’s interesting about this is that, you know, the national
conversation right now in India is, this is a national
referendum on democracy, democracy is at stake in India. And I think what’s interesting about how quickly the rhetoric has changed over the past five years, since the BGP and Narendra Modi came into
the power is the fact that, you know, how could the largest democracy in the world all of a sudden become part of the conversation
around authoritarianism. So why India, and does
it really have to do with the entrance of the BJP and Narendra Modi into power in 2014? So a lot of it does have to do, from the civil society perspective, a lot of it does have
to do with the election of the BJP and Narendra Modi in power. Narendra Modi is kind of
your classic strongman, he is a nationalist, he has deep ties to the Hindu right, he loves Twitter, so he loves to attack
his rivals on Twitter, you know, he kind of really displays a lot of those bombastic
qualities that we expect to see from a strongman. And it’s been able, and
it has kind of served to really empower a lot
of kind of vigilante-ism and mob violence in India that
wasn’t present previously. And a lot of it has to do
with the history of the BJP, the BJP was established in 1951, it is the foil to the Congress Party, which is kind of a big tent umbrella party that is known for secularism,
is known for pluralism, also plagued by horrific
scandal and corruption, unfortunately, which
really allowed for space for the BJP to step in. The BJP grew out of an
organization called the RSS, which was established in 1921,
which is really synonymous with the concept of
what’s called Hindutva, which is the concept of a Hindu nation. So when the BJP was
campaigning, and it became clear that they were going to
win an outright majority in parliament, it created a lot of concern for a lot of us in the
civil society community, because most of us knew that periods of BJP power have been
equated with repression of minorities, repression of activists, and repression of leftist causes. So this is a picture of the RSS, for those that are not familiar. One of the specific examples
of kind of state repression that we’ve been seeing over
the past couple of years is, most recently, the national
register of citizens, which is happening in Assam. So if this goes through, this
will represent the single largest voter disenfranchisement
initiative in history. So what the government is
doing is they are establishing a national register,
specifically in Assam, for people to be able to vote, but it’s disproportionately
affecting Muslims who are living in Assam who
do not have documentation, and are unable to register,
but who have been residing in the state for decades,
often their families have been living there
for many, many years. So that’s one example, and really playing on this kind of xenophobic sort of sentiment, and resistance from the Hindu majority in Assam. So another sign of kind
of growing repression that we’ve been seeing over
the past few years is kind of the rise of these vigilante
groups in cow protection. So the Human Rights Watch has reported that 44 people have been killed
over the past five years, specifically related to
kind of perceived breaches of protection of cows, which
are legally protected in India, but primarily mobs have been
targeting groups like Dalits, which are kind of the
lowest caste in India, within the Hindu system,
and Muslims, as well. And this is a hate
crime watch organization that started up in India, and they’ve been tracking open source, kind of the number of hate
crimes against minorities that have been perpetrated
over the past 10 years or so, and they’ve noticed, of the 252 incidents that they’ve reported since 2008, 90% of them occurred
after the 2014 election, when Narendra Modi and
the BJP came into power. So what’s interesting about this is that a lot of people say, well, can this really be linked to the BJP? Can this really be
linked to kind of regime, or an administration change in India? And Modi is a very interesting politician, because a lot, a lot can’t
directly be attributed to him, because he’s never
actually given a press conference in India, he’s never spoken
out publicly in India about any of these particular situations, about the killings of secular academics, about mob violence, about
growing vigilante-ism, because that’s something that he’s done, even since he was a Chief
Minister in Gujarat. In 2002, he was Chief
Minister of the state, and whenever there was the largest example of communal violence, in which nearly 2,000 Muslims were killed. He’s never spoken out
publicly against that, there have been court cases
to try and establish kind of liability for his
administration at the time, none have been successful,
and he’s gone after groups that have continued to file
litigation against him. So all of this to say is
that, again, why India? India, we have this concept of India as this really pluralistic kind of democratic nation, and
historically speaking, it is a country that hasn’t necessarily exhibited
signs of authoritarianism. There have been periods in the past, like Indira Gandhi’s Emergency in 1975, and a history of kind of
restrictive surveillance over civil society and
activists and journalists. But in 2014, it really
did usher in this new era of kind of national conversation, and national questioning
of, is this a period of growing illiberalism,
is this a growing period of authoritarianism that we
haven’t really seen before in this country? And so I don’t really have
a good answer for that, I think as somebody who, you know, was present at the time when
some of these actions started to take place, organization,
NGOs like Amnesty International and Greenpeace had their assets frozen, several organizations have
been forced to shut down. I think that it’s been
a real challenge to, to understand, you know,
how kind of the shrinking of civil space is either representative of authoritarianism or liberalism or not, but I think that’s
something that I will allow and defer to some of my colleagues, who study these things from
a more academic perspective to debate and discuss. But in terms of India’s place
and kind of the leadership that it represents in the region, it has always been kind
of a beacon of democracy and liberalism within the region. But some of that is changing
at this point, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Myanmar
have always been classified as flawed democracies or hybrid regimes by people like Freedom
House, or The Economist. And India has always kind of been a place of refuge for people who have fled some of these other more restrictive regimes, but the concern is, is that it’s changing. And so I, the question that I have, as somebody who worked
there, and as somebody who works as a journalist
and as an activist is, you know, is there enough,
is there enough focus on a place like India,
who has this reputation of liberalism, and of kind of
still functioning democracy, but is that democracy really as functional as we think it is? (audience applauds) – Latif, thank you, Christine. So we’ll move over to Turkey now, which has a very different
history than, than India, effectively, and I’m
wondering if you can walk us through some of that,
and some of the features of Erdoğan’s rule in Turkey,
and authoritarianism in Turkey, and how much of that can
be historically rooted, and how much of that’s more recent? (overlapping chattering) – First, I would like to thank Osamah for organizing this actually
timely and important discussion for us, and I’m happy
to come back again here, which I described home
the last three years. When we look at
authoritarianism in Turkey, especially today, and
many of you might think, actually, it’s a new
phenomenon, it’s new something which Erdoğan has started, which he’s not. When, just from 1920, when Mustafa Kemal
Atatürk established his rule in Turkey, the promises he’s, he made, and also 2002, when AKP
government comes in power, and when Erdoğan makes promises, the six promise, when I
compare them, it’s so similar. The, first of all, 1920, after
the Ottoman went, collapsed, and independent Turkish
rule was successfully won, but Turkish state was divided
by Western power as a part of the Sèvres agreement, this Sèvres agreement always stayed there, and has been there at the
mind of Turkish peoples, and governments, and as a way, monopolize their power, when they, any authoritarian regimes
keep point that agreement. If they don’t follow the strong rule, what’s going to happen in the country? The country’s going to
be divided, and lose. I told you, in the 1920s, he
promised strong Turkish state, but also he’s promised a new
pluralistic constitution. Promise multiple parties, 1920, to establish democratic values, to respect freedom of people,
and respect freedom of speech, to have zero problems with neighbors, which Atatürk claimed that.
(speaking in foreign language) To have peace inside, to
have peace with the world. And to find that peaceful
resolution with Kurds, which, 1920s, was described by Atatürk, but exactly similar promises, 2002, Erdoğan come to power, he
claim exactly similar promise, to have new powers of the constitution, to respect rule of law,
to have a zero problems with neighbors, to find
a peaceful resolution with the Kurds, and, but none of them,
after almost 100 your past, has been reached in Turkey. And between the governments,
between Atatürk, 1920s, and Erdoğan’s present days, almost all Turkish government follow one or another way, similar
structure of authoritarianism. There are always the body
of this authoritarianism, that state unity is the
central, a part of that claim. The second one has been
used, the religion, Sunni, Islam has been divided, ruling, and the, monopolizing public behind
these authoritarian regimes. The third, to have a strong connection with the rest of the world, liberal economy, from even
1920s to present days, open liberal economy, that’s risen. You always find Turkish
authoritarianism, but it’s soft, because it sees, it’s described as soft from the Russian perspective, because the economic model
always has been open for western, and there is not any limitation
to other countries to come, to do business. And, of course, that other
aspect is nationalism, especially Turkey nationalism. This has been the main body
of Turkish authoritarianism, from Atatürk to present days, has been slightly different perspective, which sometimes has taken secular, military perspective, which
was from Atatürk time, especially, but today,
Islamist perspective. There’s sometimes, that
body has taken the left arm of secularism, which is
slightly respecting the, the minority’s right, at least showing, respecting the women’s
right, in, at least on the, on the propaganda level,
but 1960s and present days under Erdoğan’s regimes
has been taking part of Islamist way. But the state is a
center, always, and there, the main aim has been always that protected state military structure. I think this not just start
from Atatürk, which Ottoman ideology, when, when the state collapse, but ideology was still there,
and still is, present days. The, Atatürk I think analyzed Turkey, Ottoman system very well, and
he kept the important aspect, which is very strong, centralist aspect of the Ottoman-ism power, but also eliminate all
other aspect, for example, independent religious
institution was eliminated, taking religions under
the state authority. The state was in charge of religion. And the minority’s right, or institution, was eliminated because it was seen, the main aspect of the
collapse of Ottomans, which is Millet System, you
probably have heard about it. And the Kurdish minorities was always, when they come to difficult times, the promise is given the
Kurds for peaceful resolution. When you look at 19, 1920, when the war,
independent war was going on, especially when you look
at, analyze Atatürk’s speech in, in the city of Turkey, Yeşilköy, he give a long interview to journalists, and that interview, that interview, I think one of the most progressive, pluralistic interview you have ever seen. Atatürk’s just given right to oppositions, right to minorities, and right to Kurds, because there was difficult times, and he needed support of Kurds. But similar things, 2012, 2013, when there was a long intensive conflicts
out in the Middle East, and it affected many
other countries, like, from Egypt to Bahrain, and Syria went into that crisis, Turkey felt (mumbles), because there was a Gezi Movement in 2013, and again, same perspective, want to eliminate one of the biggest threat of the
country, which was Kurds. The threat was postponed by the
promising a peace process, so, called peace process to Kurds. And this successfully
brought all Kurdish movements and activists a (mumbles) for two years, under the peace process. But what, by 2015, already the danger in the Middle East passed, the, the system in Egypt and Tunisia had already
taken a different shape, and Turkey was already in strong position to crack down Kurds, and to
postpone its promises again. Because, but this also has, you know, corrected with the Western power, because Turkey doesn’t do justice only because of, they wanted to do it. The environment around the
world, the global environment in 2012, 2013, for a Middle East perspective, you start, the world recognize,
to respect minority’s right, to respect opposition rights. And the Western powers, you know, when you were (mumbles) from
Obama, from Merkel, or from David Cameron, they were giving space to others. But this environment today
is not, doesn’t exist. Europe has a, their own
authoritarianism system, which we talked about it, in Hungary, in France, in the United
Kingdom, which I live, there’s a strong of rise
with authoritarianism. Where there’s a rise of authoritarianism, Erdoğan benefits from this one, and use as a way, crack down every
opposition in Turkey. We don’t have any parliament
any more in Turkey, the role of, the role of
parliament is very limited, as like 1920s, when Mustafa
came out, won the war, he eliminate opposition parties, multiple parties was destroyed
and eliminated by 1924, which Erdoğan (mumbles)
these similar things today. The main opposition groups in Turkey are government organizations, Kurdish groups, and also
some liberal elements. But when you look at, today, to them, almost all Kurdish political activists, leaders, they’re in prison,
and main liberal voices, like writers, journalists,
they are in prison. And most of them are outside the country. And there is not any opposition
in Turkey exists today, because you only hear
the monopolized media, monopolized governments, and actually make elections meaningless. Last year, when I was teaching here, the first things I told my students, please don’t describe elections as part of the democratic value, if
any of you describe this one, you will be failed, because
the election is not, and we are very mistakenly
describing it over and over, election is not democracy. If it was democracy, then
Hitler, from Hitler to Saddam, and from Putin to Erdoğan, all of them are very well
elected democratic leaders. ‘Cause they only become,
election in Turkey, for example, especially last 10 years,
they monopolized media, monopolize the legal
system under one party, almost no role of
parliament, it doesn’t matter how many election you take, it will, the result is the same. Or, if they win some
places, like in small towns or big towns, then they won’t respect it, they will replace it
with one of their guy, which is happening today. For example, the city of Istanbul, after 25 years, Erdoğan’s party lost elections. But almost 10 days has passed,
they haven’t given right to opposition candidate to rule the city. They are recounting, and recounting, and making new rules, making sure that their guys win the elections. Many other Kurdish cities, who has just, last week, won the elections,
straightaway replaced with second candidate,
with Erdoğan’s party. If there is any hope
in Turkey, or a space, I think we can discuss this one more, later than part of
question time, thank you. (audience applauds) – So I’d like to pick up on Latif’s, a couple points and turn to Brian. And Brian, you mentioned that, you know, Russia’s often seen as
kind of the mothership of authoritarianism, for
lack of a better term. But are there some features
that you can pick out, that perhaps connect
to some of the others? So Latif and Christine, for instance, talked about targeting of minorities, and how much that is played
into authoritarianism, whether it’s the Kurds, or
Muslims in India, or the Dalits. What are some of the features from Russia, and how, of its authoritarianism that are either exported
abroad, or that is has picked up on from some others that
you can kind of (mumbles)? – So in terms of features
of Russian authoritarianism, one of them that’s quite widespread is that it pretends to be a democracy. So it has a constitution
that was adopted in 1993, and has many elements of both liberalism and democratic in it, including a series of checks and balances and
countervailing institutions. So what’s happened over time
is all those institutions continue to exist, but
they’ve been hollowed out. So the horizontal ones that are supposed to check executive power,
in terms of the legislature and the courts have been brought
largely under the control of the executive branch. The vertical institutions
that are also supposed to hold the central government to account, in terms of regional governments, have all largely been brought
under central control, in terms of how governors are
selected, and the dominance of the United Russia Party
at the regional level. And then this sort of ultimate
vertical check on power that’s supposed to exist,
which is elections on the, or the people, have been converted to a form of elections
which aren’t free and fair. So I’m going to take exception, as a political scientist,
with what Latif said about elections and democracy, I mean, elections are a necessary
but not sufficient part of democracy, it depends on the nature of the elections, so
the shortest definition of democracy that I know that makes sense to me is democracy is a political system in which parties lose elections. And if you unpack that,
you can see why all those, each word in that is a necessary
part of the definition. So it requires elections in
which there’s free competition between different parties,
in which there’s a more or less level playing field,
and there’s enough space for media freedom and
organization, for elections to take place that are
meaningful in that sense. So that’s a necessary part,
so Russia has elections, and one of the big tendencies since the end of the Cold War is the rise of these kind of hybrid regimes in which there’s competitive
authoritarianism. So elections are allowed to take place, just the opposition is
never allowed to win. And that’s a feature in Russia
that Russia didn’t pioneer, by any means, but I think it’s become one of the most important aspects of contemporary authoritarianism. In terms of some of the other elements, certainly there have been
important restrictions placed on media, important restrictions
placed on civil society. So, for example, state
television is heavily controlled from the Kremlin, there are
actually weekly meetings in the presidential
administration with the editors of the main television
channels to tell them what the primary issues that
they’re supposed to talk about on television are for the week. In terms of civil society,
the government has a kind of dual policy, so those
organizations that try and organization in a more political kind of space are restricted,
harassed, given the label of being foreign agents, and so on, whereas other civil society organizations are actually quite encouraged. Because if they’re in the
space of, for example, providing social support for veterans, or for people with
disabilities, or orphans, or things like that, that’s
encouraged as a supplement to what the state provides, because state administration often fails in those sorts of tasks. And so centralized grants
are provided by the Kremlin to help sort of bolster those
kind of social services. Certainly there are
attacks on journalists, some of them are quite well-known,
and opposition activists. But for the most part, they
pursue a more clever strategy of low-intensity coercion,
so they don’t feel the need to necessarily go out and shoot
and imprison lots of people. They prevent access to the ballot, people who become problematic spend part of their time sitting in prison, and the fact that they
have a criminal charge against them means they’re not eligible to run in election, so
they have a more kind of sophisticated, perhaps,
form of authoritarianism than simply brute force, but
one that is quite effective in limiting the space to
opponents of the regime. Now, there are other areas
where there is more freedom, for example, in contrast
to China, for example, the internet is quite free in Russia, and the opposition is
heavily represented there. And probably the best
known opposition figure is a guy named Alexei Navalny, who has several elements of his campaign, but the most effective one
are anti-corruption videos, where they expose how
wealthy some of the people around Putin have become, and
how they managed to do this. And these videos get
millions of views on YouTube, and people know about
them and talk about them, but it’s never allowed to
cross over into the sort of more dominant mainstream
television network. So one of the big issues going forward is whether there will be
a more concerted effort to crack down on the internet. There are a series of
legislative initiatives right now that they’re talking about that would create a
so-called sovereign internet that would try and detach it a bit from the rest of the internet. And that’s probably the
most worrying development, because it would eliminate that space that has existed throughout the Putin era for more opposition and
liberal minded voices to be, to be heard by the
rest of the population. – Thank you, Azra, you
described a different form, which is fascinating, kind of
the, and I’m curious how much the fear of chaos is used, and,
as an authoritarian feature. I’m referencing the Bosnian
war, but then also some of the other features that
may be drawn on, including, you mentioned that this,
a very broad bureaucracy, that it actually involved
a lot of corruption within the society, and
where other features that Bosnia-Herzegovina may draw on from the other examples we’ve heard. – Thank you for that. Just to piggyback on
something that Brian said, I think what’s unique
in the Bosnian case is that this huge bureaucracy
and post-war order created, also, unimaginable unemployment
rate, which is 60%, when it comes to the youth,
and then 40% when it comes to adult population, which is
actually also space through which some of these kind
of last brutal forms of control are being exercised. Because people, if they want
to, if they want to have jobs, they are invited to go to the elections, but to vote for the
predictable candidates. So a lot of this is done
through this kind of pressure to assure loyalty in order to get a job, because bureaucracy’s so huge,
and it’s the only employer. So I would say this is
kind of another twist, to what Brian has said. Also, a lot what is happening in Bosnia, in this, in this fragmented,
extremely fragmented, chaotic system, any form of
resistance is then captured and re-articulated as an
inter-ethnic form of violence, or hatred, so this is the
way in which these oligarchs who are in power, who are all
ethno-nationalist leaders, who have been legitimized
through the process of peace building, which is ironic, but this is how they
control a lot of resistance. Because as long as
there’s a certain kind of, and there’s resistance on the ground, I hope we have time to get to that, it’s packaged and branded,
there’s inter-ethnic hatred when you’re, again, brought
back to the same matrices that started the war. And another thing I wanted to say, in terms of Bosnian authoritarianism, it’s obviously very unique, due to their own Yugoslav history, due to their own unique
war and post-war situation. But they’re intimately
connected and articulated in convergence with larger
global authoritarianisms in Europe, particularly
since you have in Bosnia, you have three presidents,
who are actually selected from three ethnic groups. In Bosnia, you don’t exist
as an individual citizen, you cannot be a Bosnian, you have to be, you have to belong, politically,
you become visible only as a representative of an ethnic group. So each ethnic group
selects one of the members of the presidency, and each member of the, and they’re all from the
same nationalist party. There are basically six parties
that are part of this kind of mess, bureaucratic and political mess. They have their own authoritarian regimes who are backing them, and
which they’re flirting. So in the Republika Srpska, you have, and I had this image where, it’s gone, you had Milorad Dodik, who
was celebrated by the US early on in his career as
somebody who would stand up to the nationalist regime
in the Republika Srpska, Radovan Karadžić and Ratko Mladić. However, he turned his
speech and discourse, and became actually a close Putin ally. Right now, there’s a
huge support of Russia in the Republika Srpska when
it comes to police forces. They, military forces are
unified, but police are not, there’s a lot of exchange
very recently, and this is, again, for Brian, one of
the deans in Banja Luka, in the Republika Srpska said that Serbs are little Russians,
when they welcomed one of the Russian generals who came to visit. On the other side of the spectrum, you have the Bosniaks, who
are in very close alliance with the Gulf states, that
are investing quite a lot, especially Saudi Arabia, in
building not only the mosques and religious institutions,
but also new resorts by, you know, Olympic Village in Sarajevo was being
basically now refurbished into this huge resort for
tourists from the Balkan states, and this is the biggest
investment in southeastern Europe. And finally you have
Turkey, that’s also when, that’s also Izetbegović, one of the Muslim Bosniak politicians, whose family, basically,
has been in charge of the Muslim side of
politics since the war. His father was Alija
Izetbegović, and now the son. They’re very close friends with Erdoğan, who, when he won, Izetbegović said, “Mr. President, you’re not
only the president of Turkey, “you’re the president of all of us.” And the way in which
Turkey’s regime is present in the Balkans is through
more softer, kind of, types of power strategies,
where you have a lot of kind of investment in schooling, in education, channeled through media,
through press agencies, and through NGO work. And one final comment, when it comes to the Russian influence,
a lot of that is also done in the name of humanitarianism. So there are quite a few
centers that opened up with Russian kind of backing in Serbia and Republika Srpska to prevent floods, but they’re actually seen as
part for military kind of, not only training, but cooperation. So I’ll stop here, I have
much more to say, but no time. – No, that’s great, thank you, so Dimitar, the other kind of mothership, obviously, is supposed to be China,
right, in terms of its, the authoritarianism
example, and I’m curious how, if you could explain how
the Chinese leadership views itself, and views, for
instance, the press coverage. The New York Times has done a lot recently on the surveillance state in China. Those are two kind of separate questions, but related, can you kind of,
some of those key features, and if they view this as authoritarianism, or how they actually,
especially, in the past, we’ve talked a lot about
peaceful evolution, and how that, how the authoritarianism in China has been developed, and kind of, as a regime protection
against that, if you will. – Okay, so let me try to
respond to that, and maybe in my response, I can
also try and kind of touch on something that Brian
and Latif also mentioned, and kind of disagreed on, concerning kind of the institutions of
authoritarianism, or democracy. But earlier, when you used
the term authoritarianism, you actually added a sentence,
or a phrase after that, “For the lack of a better term.” And I do feel like we,
it’s a problematic term. What we mean by
authoritarianism is the pursuit of authority, right, and
the pursuit of authority of presumably an incumbent, right? And in that respect, I think
all of us here have a lot in common, but beyond that,
there’s different ways by which you can pursue authority. You can pursue authority the Chinese way, which I would actually call
a more totalitarian pursuit of authority, where you
try to control everything, like a controlling parent tries to control everything their
kids do, and tracks them on GPS to see where they are, right? Or you can be authoritarian
by dividing your opposition, setting people against,
against one another, and profiting from the discord. And I think that some
of the cases we refer to in the panel are better
put in that category. And there’s other kinds
of authoritarianism, which, I think in the Russian case, I see it more as either, you know, something like a
kleptocracy or gangsterism, where it’s about, like,
which particular group everybody assumes is the most powerful. And in that respect, I think, you know, the videos about corruption
might even be helpful for the Putin group to
demonstrate how effective they are in being so powerful. But, again, in that respect, you know, the authoritarianism,
I think it’s important to think about it that
way, can we define it in terms of the nature
of the pursuit of power. And in the Chinese
case, I think, you know, my impression is the
Chinese Communist Party sees their pursuit of power
as being one of total control, and one being of total control
for the pursuit of some of the benefits that you get from control, which includes stability,
unity of what might otherwise be a much more divided Chinese state. And the pursuit of economic outcomes, nationalistic outcomes,
great power outcomes. I think they see it that way, and it’s a, I think it’s a different
pursuit of power than a lot of other countries
and cases where we might call authoritarian are placed,
and kind of what they see in the Chinese model, I think,
is different in that respect. But I don’t think that
the Chinese case is also that applicable, for those reasons. That those totalitarian reasons are not, they can’t simply be adopted, even though, if Erdoğan wants to be a totalitarian, like Xi
Jinping, I don’t think he can. And I think it has to do a little bit with the fact that Turkey
does have elections, and, you know, I kind
of see, I like to think of all my political science questions through metaphor analogy,
and I kind of see the relationship between state society like the toothpaste
inside a toothpaste tube, and democracy is like when
you squeeze some of it out. You can’t put it back
in, and so as much as, I think, you know, the
post-Soviet countries in Eastern Europe, or Turkey, or Indonesia, wherever else
where we’re seeing kind of more movements towards more
authority in the incumbents, institutions do stand in the way, and prevent kind of where China is. And I think the Chinese
Communist Party sees its mission of control as
preventing that toothpaste from coming out, because they know, once it opens up, they
can’t put it back in. – That’s great, thank you, thank you for connecting those dots, too. Christine, just to pick
up on Dimitar’s point, India offers, again, as you described, and Dimitar brought up the videos that Brian had mentioned,
so there’s also this example that India likes to present
itself as the largest democracy in the world, right, and how
much does that actually play into the BJP’s attempts to kind
of impose a definitely type of control, or different
kind of rule in India, by kind of obscuring, so
the democratic elections, obscuring what’s actually
going on underneath, including the targeting of
minorities in registration? Do you want to talk
about that a little bit? – Yeah, I mean, I think that’s, you know, listening to you speak,
it really helps to, I think, put the India
case into context of, that it’s a much less direct
way of pursuing power. You know, ’cause I don’t think that, I mean, there are, there are elections, to some extent, there are protections to keep them somewhat free and fair. If you really drive down
into a local context, there’s a lot of debate around
how free and fair those are. There are the presence of voting blocks, and there’s a lot of complications there, but I think for the most
part that, you know, what really characterizes what’s happening in India right now is the growing impunity for kind of politically motivated groups to tamp down on minority, on minority causes and minority rights. So there’s this kind of
majoritarianism emerging, specifically from the Hindu right that I think is, and I’m not even sure, I think, you know, I would
love to hear more thoughts from the rest of you on how
to actually phrase that, in terms of, you know, authoritarianism, or what does that actually
look like in a formal pursuit of power, because, no, it’s
not necessarily tied up with Modi, Narendra Modi as a person, ’cause he is not necessarily an autocrat that is seeking to dismantle
constitutional protections. And it’s also a long running history, I mean, India has never been, even though it is very pluralistic, there’s always been a lot
of tension between groups, and especially depending on the state, there have been kind of,
there’s constitutional erosion around the protections
of groups, especially in the northeast, and in
Kashmir, most notably. So I think what we’re seeing, actually, is kind of a leeching of
some of that intolerance in some of these special
laws that erode some of the constitutional
protections around minorities in the border states
coming into the heartland of the country. And when I say that, I’m
thinking specifically of kind of the use of the sedition act, more often, against, especially people that are supporting Kashmiri causes, and anything that can
be deemed anti-national. Anti-national has become
a very, very popular word in India, and in particular,
to place charges, criminal charges against
those who are speaking out against kind of the state
narrative around whether or not Kashmir is part
of the Indian state, or whether the Northeast is
part of the Indian state. So there’s a lot of, I
think, kind of interesting, almost going back to what
Brian was saying, as well, about kind of the cleverness
of keeping information kind of behind the veil, in terms
of co-opting different parts of civil society, or co-opting narratives. Or, you know, kind of
shrinking the space for media, and kind of space for civic
discussion, is that, you know, no, they’re often not going out and, you know, committing assassinations. Like, the state is not
sponsoring violence, but it’s allowing violence to flourish by its lack of speaking out against it. – So Latif, the idea of sedition is one that Erdoğan has played
on very well, right, particularly post-coup, and
the failed coup attempt. Can you talk a little bit
about, on the one hand, not only the broad crackdown, and the use of this idea of external traitors, right, sponsored by the Gülen movement, but then also the fact
that you have a minority that’s kind of, that’s
allowed him to combine, in terms of the Kurds,
it’s allowed him to bring, to combine with the military, the AKP and the military with this, you know, this hated minority, as well
as kind of this internal enemy that he’s also drawn on with
focusing on internal sedition. – Around 1994, when Erdoğan was running for Istanbul election and
won, I need to scrap democracy as a past, when it’s necessarily
a way to come to power, when he come to power, then
he get out from that past. And I think many people
didn’t understand you, important value that, what
has so far he showed last 25 years, he stick with his promise. When it come to 2002 in
power, he understands that very well, there were, there were too many main oppositions, there was secular groups,
which are militaries, elite was behind that group. The second was the cleric
religious Gulen movement, which many other religious,
you know, groups was there, but the main ones was the Gulen movement. The third important power was in Turkey, and was the Kurdish movement. He understood that he
cannot fight with two, these three at the same
times, what exactly now we, you know, Dimitar just said, he managed to use coalition with some of them, and then destroy one each by one. First, he went behind the secularists, generally, he had a coalition
with the Gulen movement, and by 2010, he already managed to get over all secular militaries,
and he represent himself, he’s a better state supporter
than these old secularists. And he proved that one, as well. The later time, he made a coalition with the Kurds, 2000, in ’09, actually, started that
peace process to 2013, ’14, and then he went against
religious Gulen movement, which actually conflict didn’t start 2016, it started 2012, November,
when the religious movement established corruption case against Erdoğan. And then when that one eliminated, he went to make coalition with his, the former general, secularist group, nationalist, you know,
military perspective, 2015, against Kurds. Successfully, he has almost
destroyed any institution in Turkey which, Dimitar said, if you have an institution,
then you can come, do something, but Turkey,
there is not much institution and power left, rule of law is nothing, parliament is almost nothing. And now we have a sultan, but when you look at opposition parties, it’s as like sultans, but
different son of sultan, which is very, if he’s replaced sultan, it’s not going to make
much difference than what sultan is doing. That’s the reason Erdoğan
is not just Erdoğan himself, it create, like, Erdoğan-ism, which is, Kemalism was there, as well. When somebody replaced Atatürk, he was almost acting like Atatürk. And that’s the reason he, they keep, in, like, what just Azra said about
Turkish relationship with the Balkans, not just with Balkans, down to Somalia, and the Middle East, the Ottoman system, Ottomans, as a state, collapsed, but the minds is very present and active among all Turkish state. And as long as you manage this idea, you support this idea, if
you look at Erdoğan’s speech, all his speech, after election, it start, today, the way, it’s not
just for Ankara and Istanbul, it’s for Mecca, or Baghdad, for Kosovo. He managed all these
Ottomans, you know, different places, and I think that’s, leave almost no space for Turkey to recover from
what has been created there, when it become, as a way, a
rocky state, a fragile state, you have, you know, we see, we
saw from Saddam perspective, or Gaddafi perspective, when they’re gone, and there was not any
institution which was a problem, not because of keeping Saddam there, that wasn’t because the West had managed to keep the institutions. But Turkey, today, I think we don’t, we don’t have much institutions. The opposition today,
there’s a rise of between the who is in power, who is
second, wants to be in power, both are very right-wing nationalities, and if you look at the
CHB’s recent candidates, the videos are very ultra-nationalist, very, almost fascist, because they make, very openly, videos, of how
much, if they come to power, they will get rid of
all the Syrian refugees. They will limit all the
benefit from the state, they will do A-B-C, because that kind of space doesn’t leave much for Kurds, even the women movement,
which is very progressive, but there is not much space for them. I think, just last one, word
I would like to say, Turkey, why they politically or economically follow
Western perspective, not just from today, from
even Ottoman perspective, is the food’s always been Western, but mind always has followed the Russia. The leadership in Turkey
always has some connection with Russia, if you look at
the, Lenin’s come to power, (mumbles) come to power, and follow this almost similar
methods, but to Putin’s, when he starts his power in 1998, 2000, then later time, Turkey. Always, like, you know, I believe that if there is any real
progress, change in Turkey, we might look at the Russia first. Them, without democratic come to Russia, I think we won’t face
any democrats in Turkey. (Brian mumbles) (audience laughs) – So this allows us to shift
to kind of the last part, which is looking at building on that, opportunities for resistance,
on the ground opposition, and we can begin with
Russia, ’cause apparently, you’re gonna be the hope for the world. So this is,
(panel laughs) this is where it begins. But can you talk a little bit about that? One, on the one hand, what
is opposition look like in these kind of, we
talked about strategies of resistance, and then,
two, is there a changing view of democracy in Russia,
because of Putin’s rule, or because of the opposition? – I’m gonna start with
the second part first, in terms of changing view of democracy. So it’s frequently said in, maybe even sometimes apparently believed that Russians have some kind
of natural predisposition towards authoritarianism, right? I think the evidence
for that is very weak, and political scientists have
studied this quite closely. Now, it is true that if you ask Russians what they think the democracy means in open-ended questionnaires, about a third of them
will basically refuse to answer, or say they don’t know, right? But I don’t know if you’d
get a better response if you asked random people on the streets in lots of countries, I guess, but. So the ones who answer, their
first answer is a component of democracy, which is
civil liberties and rights, but also quite high on the
list is material prosperity. That’s what people thought
democracy was bringing them when they supported it in the early 1990s. And the political science answer, right, about sort of free and
fair elections comes, like, less than 10% of
the population mention that when they think about. So it’s about rights and freedoms, it’s about power to the people,
and it’s about prosperity, but not necessarily about institutions. They don’t kind of think
about it in that way when asked, at least in
public opinion surveys. Now, in terms of sort of
strategies of resistance, I mentioned already some
of the kind of more liberal and democratic elements, there are also some left-wing movements that are relatively
sympathetic to democracy. They have the problem that the
political space is occupied by the remnants of the Communist Party, and it’s not called the Communist Party of the Russian Federation,
which has had the same leader for more than 20 years now,
and is quite sympathetic to the Kremlin, and the Kremlin
likes it that way, right? And then on the sort of
nationalist right part of the spectrum, they also have the so-called liberal
democratic party of Russia, which is neither liberal nor democratic, and is headed by this
demagogue, Zhirinovsky, who’s also been around for
almost 30 years now, right? So one of the things that
the regime has done is tried to prevent the rise of
alternatives, right, at the national level. Some of the alternatives have left, some of the alternatives have been killed, some of the alternatives
are around and harassed, but if we look at what’s
going on, we do see, you know, at local
level, lots of protests, lots of activities,
and that sort of thing. And a lot of these protests
aren’t about political issues. So the biggest protests last
year were about the plan to raise the pension age,
but lots of people came out on the street about that. The biggest source of protests right now at the local level is
about garbage, actually, because big companies
from Moscow are taking over local garbage, sort of disposal, and building inadequate
facilities for dealing with it, and so it’s polluting the
waters and stuff like that, so people come out about things like that. And those people who sort
of track that kind of issue see not only a persistence
of those types of protests, but growing kind of protests,
and it’s not surprising, because average living
standards have declined for the last five years,
and there’s no real prospect for renewed growth, unless world energy prices
change dramatically. So there is, I think, a growing sense at the popular level, that Putin-ism is kind
of running its course, but there’s also no obvious exit, because they prevented the rise
of any kind of alternatives. So I’m not predicting this,
but I would also not rule out that either some effort to cut
off Russia from the internet, or some move towards extending
Putin’s power beyond 2024 would lead a lot of this
socioeconomic discontent to become more politicized. – Azra, do you want to talk about? – Sure, so immediately after the war, I think there was a lot of excitement about the prospects of democracy, and the Dayton Peace Agreement that created this monstrous, I call it, kind of ballistic state,
which eats its own people, was supposed to be a temporary solution. However, the temporary solution
became a permanent solution, and every time there’s any pressure to change the Dayton Peace Agreement that locks people into
these ethnic buckets that’s seen as an attack,
used by these ethnocrats, is an attack on democracy itself. So they’re kind of playing the discourse in order to eliminate
any kind of opposition to change the constitution itself. So that leaves the
majority of people caught in this space in which they feel, they think that democracy
in principle is okay, but their own version of
democracy is deeply flawed. Which leads to a certain kind of, so I’ll just mention
kind of four tendencies. One is that they, there’s
a growing anti-citizenship, I call it anti-citizenship,
which is kind of detachment of especially young people,
these are the people I studied, from the state itself, because
they have all these levels of governance, and they, the state, it seems very removed from
their every day lives. They don’t, there’s no sense
of really Bosnian-hood, rather, their identification
is with these sub-states, sub-state levels, so state becomes empty, even though it’s so huge. This anti-citizenship becomes
a kind of a generative, active withdrawal from
state, from politics, from official politics. So what the majority of young
people are doing is they’re, even though they’re
described as kind of lazy, or disinterested, actually, they’re kind of objectively withdrawing
from that politics, thinking about who they
will have coffee with today, and thinking about how they will become democratic citizens elsewhere, in some imagined Europe,
or somewhere else. Every, the time between
that, these two spaces, it collapses, there’s
no, there’s no vision of what should happen, so
there’s a lot of this kind of suspended act of waiting, so I call that anti-citizenship. The only way in which
opposition articulates itself, because the process is so ethnicized, and there is no incentive
to create any kind of inter trans-ethnic, inter-ethnic, trans-ethnic coalitions,
is to take the streets. And Bosnians have been taking the streets, the first time in 2013, when,
due to ethnic bickering, the government failed to issue, to issue this unique master citizen number, which every citizen has to get,
in order to get a passport, because of this kind of frozen internal politic-ing, they were not issuing that
for a while, which resulted in a new citizen, citizens being born, but made invisible immediately, because they didn’t get this number. But it led to death of certain babies that supposed to receive
treatment elsewhere, they couldn’t leave the country, the protests erupted,
people took the streets. That died out after a couple of months, then, a year later, in 2014,
Bosnian Spring happens, and it surprised the
majority of the world, and other people who know, and it articulated itself around class. And the fact that Bosnia is post-socialist is often eliminated in
scholarship, as well, because we’re so much
focused on ethno-nationalism and post-war and all of
these discourses that are, to some extent, suffocating, you know, both imagination and politics. And what, what happened
is that unemployed youth, pensioners took the
streets in huge numbers. And that was the international community, that’s basically has
been in charge of much of Bosnian post-war life,
was shocked by that, because this was not the grammar that they recognized, there’s no, there’s no, it was not, it
was purposefully not ethnic. And without the support of
the international community, and due to all sorts of, again,
political games, this ended. And the protests ended, and a lot of disillusionment happened because the protests didn’t succeed, even though the protests
started by unemployed workers who are perpetually
waiting to be employed, and from unemployed youth and pensioners. And finally, the biggest
protest is happening right now, and that protest is people
leaving the country. Bosnia is losing its youth in numbers that are truly, to some
people, are alarming. Some, it, I’ve read most recently that in the last five years,
more than 300,000 people left, which, for the country
that’s 3.2 million people, is a huge number, so that’s the protest. Now, they’re, they’re not anymore waiting, they’re not suspended,
they’re just leaving. And even though, you know,
the biggest news about Bosnia in the popular press was
Karadžić got the life sentence, Milošević is in prison for
life, when I call people, and what they talk about is,
another bus of youth left, and no one is crying,
they’re leaving, right? So this is the story on the
ground, so I’ll end there. – Dimitar, do you want to talk about the Chinese
possibilities for opposition, and if there’s any connections to what Azra may be describing,
about a brain drain, or a youth drain, and
what Brian is describing, about kind of the official,
official opposition that may be as bad as the existing regime? – Okay, so I don’t think that we’re
experiencing a brain drain in China right now, so maybe I’ll not, try not to answer that. But in terms of, like, you know, prospects for the future, or opposition, I think the prospects for democracy in China are quite low. And I don’t know the best
way to describe this, so the political scientist, Joseph Nye, coined this term, soft power, in 1990. And the basic idea is that, you know, you can kind of get the rest of the world, or others, or whoever
it is, your children, your students, to do what
you want without forcing them to do it, or without kind
of preaching it to them. In Bulgaria, in the 1980s,
and I think this was true in Russia, and in China,
kind of the allure of democracy was quite strong, because people saw it through
the lens of soft power. They saw it through Coca-Cola, they saw it through
Hollywood, and kind of one of the ironies of the Cold War
is that it kind of, you know, removed the cover, unpeeled
kind of the layer between what people thought about democracy,
and some of the realities. And some of the realities are difficult, democracy doesn’t naturally translate into prosperity, peace, and unity among the people. Sometimes it can be violent, sometimes it can be problematic. And I don’t know if
that’s what’s driving it, but the interest in democracy
among the Chinese people, according to surveys, has
been going down perpetually. And so people even who are
dissatisfied with the regime, and I’ve done this even in surveys, where it wants to try and get
people angry at the regime, their response is not that they
want more democracy, right? And so if you’re missing that
kind of underlying demand, I don’t see how whatever
happens would come in and provide that as a (mumbles). Now that doesn’t mean that, you know, that the Chinese regime is bulletproof, I think it
has a lot of weaknesses, and I think it has, some of
the weaknesses, the ones that I believe exist most, or similar
to what Azra mentioned is this kind of anti-citizenship,
that people are becoming, in an, again, in an ironic way, disconnected from the, from
the Party and from the state, even though they are connected
digitally all the time. It’s kind of this passive surveillance, this passive Leninist control that the Chinese Communist
Party has put together, and in some sense, very successful, in terms of providing them
the information they need to be able to put down
any sort of opposition. But it does it, it’s almost so successful that I think that they’re
under-investing kind of the more traditional
political mobilization that built the party up in
the past and sustained it. And so, again, in terms of the future, I don’t see democracy, but
that doesn’t mean I see kind of sustained CCP dominance. – But what’s interesting is what you just described also
takes us back to spring of ’89, where you said that they
had failed to kind of invest in this kind of grassroots,
and you almost see this return to that, which is interesting. Christine, India is a
somewhat hopeful case because we, to your point earlier, we haven’t gone the
full authoritarian road. Do you want to talk about
some of the oppositions, including from human rights,
civil society organizations, including not just the monitoring, but the challenge to BJP
and some of its policies? – Yeah, so I think, you know, just to kind of reiterate some of my earlier
points, you know, I think, you know, there’s always been
a culture of protest in India. It’s a very, it has always had
a very vibrant civil society, and part of kind of the
concern and the shock around the country right now is the fact that that space appeared to be shrinking, and that really unnerved a lot of people. So in 2014, in 2015, for example, it even, even Richard Verma, who was the US ambassador
to India at the time, expressed his concern officially
about the chilling effect on civil society and media in India. And we can see that also continuing along with mainstream media in India,
especially with broadcast. Several CNN, IBN journalists, prominent journalists
have left because of kind of the nationalistic co-optation of some of the main media houses in India. And some of them do
allege, and I, this hasn’t, I have not studied this, but
according to some of the people that have worked in some
of those news rooms, you know, they allege
government intervention, as well, into some of the media that is mainstream right now. And you can see this
especially in the coverage of the recent attack in Kashmir, where 40 or 50 Indian
military were killed. So all of that to say, there’s concern about the homogenization of
discourse in the country. That being said, I think
it’s very important to remember that India is a huge country, and there are places where
the state is very strong, and there are places where
the state is very weak. And so I think when we
talk about, you know, is there a backslide into illiberalism, or is there a backslide into, you know, a backslide of democracy, is that. You know, I think the elections
at this point are going to be extremely crucial in
figuring out what is going to be the future
trajectory of the country. So we’ll find out on May 23rd, and so I think, you know, if we can, if we can see evidence that, you know, elections at a local level
have adequate protections to be free and fair, and seeing
how the coalitions turn out, I think, to a certain extent, we can see whether or not there will be a repudiation of the current trend, or a strengthening of the current trend. And then to your last point about the BJP, and specifically some of its policies, there is a thriving online community. Some of the kind of local resistance groups, especially in the
Northeast, in Kashmir, their internet is
surveilled at a heavier rate than the rest of the country, and often their internet will
get shut down during times of protest, curfews will be put in place, it’s heavily militarized. So you do see kind of a
different manifestation of some of this intolerance
in certain areas of the country more than others. So in places like that,
it’s very difficult to push back against some of the current administration’s policies, especially recently in Kashmir, with kind of the multi-week curfews
that were put down. But in other places in the country, in Bangalore, in Delhi, in Calcutta, in Mumbai, I mean, these are places where, you know, we do see
growing arrests of protestors, but people are still coming
out onto the streets. And so I do think that India
is a very hopeful case, but I do think that the outcome of this election is gonna be crucial. – Latif, if you want to close us out, I mean, it’s, you had already mentioned that you don’t see much
opposition anymore, because so many institutions
have been really kind of eliminated by Erdoğan,
but if you want to, if you can talk a little bit about what, what possibilities may
exist for resistance, and how that could be evidenced, and what possibilities exist. You’ve been very active on
the Kurdish front, especially for Americans to assist,
that would be great. – In Turkey, if we, there’s
a strong Kurdish resistance, it has been always there, and still there, even though most of the political leaders, representative activists,
thousands of them are in prison, even actually in present
days, almost 3,000, they are in hunger strike, some of them over 100 days already. There is already active resistance in different shapes from
Kurdish movements, continue. And there are also strong
woman movement in Turkey, as well, we cannot underestimate this one, and like when 100,000 of them go to street and stay against authoritarian regimes, because the regimes in Turkey
always has been body politics, and woman sexuality has
been part of the politics. And good mothering, or others,
others has been attached by this state authority. And these are, have been
there, but when we look at the large Turkish public, the AKP, the government
party, Erdogan’s party, very successfully, they
used a charity system, which is old Ottoman charity system, which is the help of the municipalities, and to reaching almost every household, to giving them anything
from the taxpayer’s money, but providing this one as Erdogan’s or party’s money, as a bringing way, the state is an equal
of AKP government party, like a Communist Party
equals state type of things, which is becoming untouchable way. You know, you cannot
touch and criticize it, and you cannot touch and
criticize this kind of AKP. Also, Turkey, historically, there is not actually
strong protest movement, when we put aside, like,
Gezi Movement in 2013, historically, the state
always has been very important on obeying the rule of
the state, and the leader of the state has been the main dominant. This has been that
tradition since Ottomans. I’m not, but we also have
seen the changes in Turkey, because Erdogan managed to
continue this charity system, and stretching his power with that kind of alternative economic model, but now economy’s growing worse. And then, in, after 2016, what he did, he grabbed all these Gulan-ist, Islamist, he positioned people’s wealth,
it transferred into states, and he used this wealth, part of the economic
practice (mumbles) advantage. There, he has two options from here to do, if economic continue, but
once he can go after some of these people’s wealth,
some minority’s wealth, because previously, 1950s, some Greek minority’s
wealth was transferred. In the earlier version,
there was similar things, Armenian and Jewish wealth
was transferred to state, but I don’t know what is,
could be different groups, because between 2002, 2007, there was certain business
people’s wealth was transferred, one of them, the main opposition leaders, who was scared to France after that. I think one things can increase people’s criticism will be economy, you
know, in a different way, as I always say, Turkish
people like (mumbles). Once you don’t touch the pocket, they won’t do anything else, even if they see the 100,000
people dead on the street, because it doesn’t matter, have
anything to have (mumbles), it’s not going to affect
the western part of Turkey, because it’s not a method,
actually it’s even militarism. And a woman, still Turkish
very patriarchal societies, and actually, woman right
hasn’t been even definite by their own families, by people, as well. And I think only maybe economic perspective, and also
some other global trends might change the dimension in Turkey. But once it, Turkey change,
it doesn’t change very softly, it change very radically. – That’s great, and that also ties us back into the beginning of the first panel, where we talk about some
of the economic pressures in Eastern Europe that
may have linked not only to the collapse of communist
rule, but then also the rise in nationalism of the past decade. So we have time for one or two questions, why don’t I open it up before I wrap up. Does anybody have any questions that they would like to ask the panel? Robert?
(Robert mumbles) – [Robert] I guess it’s for anybody, maybe even deepen
(mumbles) for inspiration, this idea of, I wanted to challenge the idea that you can’t put the
toothpaste back in the tube. ‘Cause I, you know, I don’t
want to be that German historian that brings up the Nazis, but, I mean, I think that, you know,
Germany is a country that did have democratic
institutions, and, you know, much like Erdogan, Hitler came to power in the
bus, right, of democracy. And so I guess, I don’t know
if there’s a question there, but I want to kind of
pull on that a little bit and see what happens,
because I’m not so sure that democratic institutions
defend themselves, and I think, I also, yeah,
well, I’ll leave it at that, so, for the sake of time. – Okay, thank you, Robert. So just to clarify, I didn’t mean that the democratic
institutions defend themselves. Instead, what I meant is that
they perpetuate themselves, in terms of the pursuit of power, such that once you open up
society into a democratic format, the nature of power and
competition is gonna be structured around those rules, it may be unfair, the elections may be stolen, but you will still be competing
in that type of space. And it will, whatever happens to Erdogan, or whoever comes forward,
they’re still gonna be stuck with the fact that people
are gonna expect elections, and they’re gonna have to figure out a way to disenfranchise them, and
win them without losing. And that’s a very different
type of authoritarianism, I think, than a Leninist
type of authoritarianism, that maybe Ataturk originally envisioned, that Lenin definitely envisioned, Stalin, to some extent perfected, and
Mao revolutionized, right? That type of, that type of attempt to control is one
that’s all within the tube, and that’s kind of what I
meant by these institutions. Once they’re out, you
can’t get rid of them. You can corrupt them, you
can try and defraud them, but it’s hard to cancel them. You can delay them with a military junta for a couple of years, like Thailand did, but eventually, you have to hold them, and you hold them when you
think you can win them. But it does, in my, in my impression and my kind of empirical perspective,
I’ve never seen these types of institutions removed wholesale once they’ve been put in place. – Go back to your description of the toothpaste is
interesting, because there was a second strong Turkish
leaders is, is İsmet İnönü. He actually wants,
1960s, mentioned exactly what you just, you know, he told his son, once, you know, the toothpaste come out,
you cannot put back. And his son, it was 1990s, was politician, and he was also physicist,
he was actually teaching at one of the best universities in Turkey. And one of, he was described,
there was a discussion at the (mumbles) about, you
know, the democratic values, and he said, “Actually,
my father was wrong, “when he mentioned that the toothpaste, “you know, cannot be
reversed, but I have seen “that it is reversed.” He was critical of his
own father, Erdal İnönü. And yes, when easily, you
know, democratic values and (mumbles) ideologists or rule of
law can be destroyed by the, any authoritarian regimes. But in Turkey, for example, tomorrow, if Erdogan or, you know, if stated, this ethnic group is
dangerous for the state, following that, you will see millions of people go after them,
and destroy their houses, and grab their wallet, which was happened, actually, 2015, in many Turkish cities, when they start (mumbles) against Kurds, even many, you know, some Kurdish people in western part of Turkey,
their business was destroyed, people start being attacked
by the state, as well, because the state forces,
sorry, public, as well. I think there is not any rule of law, for example, in Turkey, to go after, you
know, criticize Erdogan, or any groups who fit this kind of hate propaganda. When Erdogan mentioned about, you know, academics who signed the petition, I am also one of these people
who signed the petition, you know, 1,200 people
simply just criticize what the state take in possession, without active involvement,
any street protests, or anything else, which is very simple, basic individual protests. You can sign some petition,
criticize government position, but it hasn’t stopped from Erdogan, and many public people start to actually criticizing the academics. The (mumbles) was signed
by the other students, and they were attacked,
and people had to escape the country as a ways to, you know, keeping alive, because
these kind of regimes, very mafia-atic action they have, as well, as like in Germany, 19,
in the late ’30s happened, where youth of the Hitlers, or
different groups went behind. They were attacking every,
different neighborhoods, but the state didn’t do anything else, because state was protesting, supporting this kind of regime. Similar things you can
see exactly in Turkey, but there is not any
judge to take decision against anybody who are not proved by Erdogan. – Okay, well, thank you for coming. We’ll be back at two
o’clock for the third panel. Thanks so much, everybody, this was great. (audience applauds)

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