Guderian – Myth & Reality
German Panzer General Heinz Guderian is one of the best-known German commanders of the Second World War. This is due to his accomplishments in building up the Panzerwaffe and later on being the general inspector of the German armored forces. But also due to his memoirs, which in Germany have the name Erinnerungen eines Soldaten, literally ‘Memories of a Soldier’, quite contrary to the English edition, with the more marketable title ‘Panzer Leader’, yet the problem is a lot of people, even historians, far too often took Guderian’s memoirs at face value. Time to set the record straight. The narrative Guderian created in his memoirs is that he and few supporters were building up the German Panzerwaffe against major resistance within the German military. One example Guderian provides is the reasons for publishing the book Kampfwagenkrieg from an Austrian general, since he noted that the German military would only listen to foreign experts, not their own advisors. To quote directly from his memoirs: “Even at the risk that foreign experts might become aware of Eimannsberger’s thoughts, this decision had to be taken, because the resistance of the German authorities had to be eliminated, due to their tendency to listen to foreign opinions instead of their own advisors, there was almost no other way to break those views [than by publishing Eimannsberger’s book].” Such claims are common also in other books, for instance stead of Panzer General Oskar Munzell who notes “The first battles for this new weapon were infinitely heavy and tenacious, especially in organizational matters.” Yet there’s very little evidence that various modernization and Panzer advocates in Germany ran into major troubles at all. Probably one of the best examples is that Guderian received command of one of the three new Panzer divisions in 1935 and he was still a Colonel, whereas the other commanders were already Generals. The German military storm Markus Pöhlmann thus notes quite ironically that Guderian’s career was more influenced by his real connections and not his alleged enemies. Similarly, Guderian rarely had revolutionary views. Quite often his views were common among the advocates of mechanization. “This image of military prophet struggling against great odds is attractive to military historians. Nevertheless, it does not fairly reflect the experience of Guderian or the German armor theorists in the 1920s and 30s. The careers of German tank and motorisation advocates prospered.” But let’s look at one of the alleged opponents of Guderian and the Panzerwaffe, namely General Beck. To quote from Guderian’s memoirs: “General Beck took offense at the plans of the armored troop. He primarily wanted tanks as a support weapon off the infantry and therefore the largest unit of our weapon should have been the tank brigade. He did not think much of building tank divisions.” This is a rather interesting interpretation of the facts that we have from the data and the archives. Beck in a memorandum advocated for the expansion of the armored forces by creating additional Panzer brigades. As such, the total number of Panzer battalions should be increased from 36 to 48. Since such a major expansion was resource intensive, he even agreed to postpone the creation of 12 anti-tank battalions. Additionally, Beck noted that the Panzer was not just the support weapon for the infantry and that the Panzer Division was a promising organizational unit. Beck advocated for Panzer brigades next to the existing Panzer divisions due to the limitations of a fast expansion. Especially since he thought that the Panzer I and II were insufficient and insisted that at least 2/3rds of the Panzer forces should be equipped with Panzer III’s. Hence Beck’s objections and suggestions Aston’s were along a slower and proper expansion of the German armed forces, in reasonable numbers and with adequate equipment. Such reservations were quite common, as noted in my video on the German army expansion from 1933 to 1939. Furthermore, Beck’s concerns about the Panzerkampfwagen I’s were very soon validated by the experiences of the German tank units in the Spanish Civil War. The one major issue with the reception of Guderian is and was that he gathered a large amount of, let’s call them, fanboys and to be totally transparent here, I was one of them for quite some time. Many of his biographers and authors took not only his various accounts at face value, but sometimes they even edit some stuff of their own on top of it. For instance “The claim that Guderian first saw the use of tanks here [on the Western Front in 1917 is inaccurate and indicative of the biographers’ efforts to relate his career as early as possible to the mechanization of war.” Another example is the biographer Kenneth Macksey. He notes that Guderian published several articles that won him admirers and enemies. Additionally, he added that Guderian in 1924 was already considered a tank expert, yet James Coram notes: “As a matter of fact, Heinz Guderian wrote only 5 signed articles from the Militär Wochenblatt between 1922 and 1928, all of them mundane pieces including ‘French motorized supply at Verdun’ and ‘Reconnaissance and security for motor marches’ Guderian’s tactical articles tended to be short pieces of only a page or two, Such ‘Cavalry and Armored Cars’ and ‘Troops on Motor Vehicles and Air Defense’.” This is a very similar assessment to that of Marcus Perma, now one aspects needs further investigation, namely the Battle of Kursk – Operation Zitadelle and Guderian’s alleged opposition against it and the use of the early Panzerkampfwagen V Panther. Well, although “This version has been recited in the literature usually unchecked, so of course by Nehring and also by Friedrich Wilhelm Hauck. For Karl-Heinz Frieser it was clear that Guderian ‘energetically, but in vain’ protested against the use of the not front-ready Panzer V. Bernd Wegner came to the verdict the Guderian was ‘generally, or at least of the timing and approach skeptical’ about the Battle of Kursk.” Now of course the question is ‘Did Guderian really oppose Operation Zitadelle and the use of the early Panthers? While according to Pöhlmann there’s basically nothing in written form, like in Guderian’s or spare conference notes. They show that Guderian objected the operation or the use of the Panther in it. One of the few elements he noted was that Guderian proposed a different kind of approach in the tactical level, when such an alternative doesn’t support any claims of major opposition, as Guderian noted in his memoirs, whereas for other people that opposed Kursk, there is written evidence available. And Pöhlmann also notes that Guderian’s influence on Operation Zitadelle and the deployment of the Panther were limited from the get-go, since Guderian only recently had regained an influential position because in winter 1941 Hitler had sacked Guderian and only in 1943 called him back to become General Inspector of the German armored forces. Now, Guderian is also well known for his pre-war book Achtung Panzer! In this case, two of my main sources, Pöhlmann and Corum slightly disagree about its importance and assessment. Corum is more positive about it and notes “Achtung Panzer! was indeed a brilliant and original book But it was the product of a long evolution of armoured thought that relied heavily on the work of previous armour theorists, most particularly the Austrian general Ludwig Ritter Von Eimannsberger, whose major book, The Tank War (Der Kampfwagenkrieg) was published in 1934 and gained a wide audience in the German army.” Interesting here is that Pöhlmann notes that Achtung Panzer was, first and foremost, a book not intended for experts. It is a book that should convince the general population and politicians, thus it was more of a public relations publication. Additionally, the previously mentioned book from Eimannsberger, Kampfwagenkrieg, was published a few years earlier and was the first major publication in the German language that contained a convincing military analysis and included contemporary proposals for the organization of Panzer units, although claims that Guderian’s book was plagiarism are wrong. Thus Achtung Panzer was an important and crucial book, yet less revolutionary than often claimed. That for a book being more famous, although there was another one more revolutionary before it, is not particularly uncommon. Yet there is a more glaring problem here in relation to EimannsBerger’s book and contributions, namely that Guderian didn’t include him at all in his autobiography initially and only edited a paragraph in the 4th edition after Eimannsberger’s son wrote to Guderian and according to Corum, this is a common theme in Guderian’s autobiography. “Even for an autobiography, Guderian’s Panzer Leader goes in far too much self-aggrandizement. Volckheim, for example, receives passing mention in one sentence of the book. Lutz heartily praised – mostly for his support of Guderian’s ideas after he became Lutz’s chief of staff in 1931. Other officers who contributed significantly to German Armour development in the 1920s and 1930s, men like Pirner, Heigl, von Eimannsberger, von Vollard-Bockelberg, and the many officers who trained in the Kazan tank school are glossed over or not mentioned at all in Guderian’s account.” As such, it is also quite interesting Guderian’s work didn’t catch much criticism at all for so long. Now some of you might probably say that Guderian’s memoirs ‘Panzer Leader’ should be called ‘Panzer Liar’. Whereas I think a certain amount of nuance is necessary and thus find the term ‘liar’ out of place here. First off, human memory is known to be highly inaccurate,, even in regular circumstances. Our memory is not a storage device – it is more of a guidance and orientation device. As such, it adapts regularly and additionally, it adapts when we use it. For instance if we tell a story and we brag a bit, that bragging over time might transform the memory. Additionally, own contributions are usually inflated whereas those of others are usually deflated, which is understandable because we experience how much we worked, but rarely are we able to experience how much somebody else worked. Another factor is that we adapt the content of our speech to the audience, thus in some cases you will neglect to amplify certain points. You probably talk differently about your girlfriend with your best buddy than with her father. As such, talking can change your memory, so even without conscious intentions, memoirs will have inaccuracies, mistakes or blatant errors that make absolutely no sense, but for the person writing them, it might appear as truth and their representation of what they experienced. Then we should not forget the commanders like Guderian were involved with one of the hardest and largest conflicts in human history, that affected millions on all sides. Let’s not forget that most people can’t even admit when they made a wrong argument or a simple mistake that is obvious, yet they often go to enormous lengths to justify their actions or refuse. Well, can you imagine admitting that you made a fatal mistake that led to the death of one person, let alone thousands? I certainly can’t, seeing how I often engaged in various comment wars over the years. So it is hard to tell what parts of Guderian’s memoirs, But due to regular memory mistakes, self-serving public relations, cognitive dissonance, setting old feuds and a mixture of these elements over the years. I personally think that historians and authors are mainly accountable here, since it is their responsibility to fact-check, unless they write fiction. Although I make an exception here for the early ones like Liddel Hart and Panzer General Nehring, since they were very close to the action. Additionally, many documents were still off-limits and the standards of research were also different, yet for more recent publications, such neglect and mistakes are less tolerable. Now for those of you who want some kind of final assessment on Guderian, I think James Corum gives a short and fair assessment: “If Guderian had been a modest man and never written a word about himself, he would have gone down in history as an excellent general a first-rate tactician, and a man who played a central role in establishing and developing the first Panzer divisions, but Guderian was far from modest.” If you ever wondered why I stay away from memoirs and oral history for the most part, well the reason is simple: one of the books I read as a teenager was Guderian’s Panzer Leader, and I took most of it at face value. It basically turned me into a Wehraboo. Luckily, years later at university we had a guest lecture that covered military history and without these lectures I probably would still believe a lot of bullshit that I got from Guderian’s book. Of course, I’m pretty sure I still run around with quite some myths and inaccuracy from other sources as well, but hey, It’s an interesting journey. If you want to join the ride be sure to subscribe or even become a Patreon. Anyway, thank you for watching and see you next time.
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Guderian says a lot of false things and opposed progressive ideas which increased the effectiveness Of Germany's use of armor. On TIK's channel, he notes how generals like Rommel discovered divisions were more efficient in combat when their panzer divisions had a 50/50 ratio of armor to infantry ( I don't know what the unit of measure is). As a result panzer divisions reorganized to the 50/50 ratio resulting in less panzers per panzer division and GREATER OVER ALL Pz Division efficiency (more Pz divisions were created though the number of tanks in the German Army stayed the same). Guderian opposed this reorganization which Rommel discovered in N.Africa work better than the 2:1 ratio. Combat results spoke loud and clear. Rommel was right and Guderian was wrong. Diluting Pz division to a 50/50 armor/motorized-infantry ratio was an innovative idea that worked…
All good points on human memory. I would add that when he or anyone is referencing someone else liking or disliking something that is not in the historical record it is possible they are remembering (as best they can) a conversation that ever made it to the written record. In the case of WW2 Germany it might have been a dangerous thing to put something down in writing that disagreed with those higher up in the COC. The fact that you can find records people disagreeing with strategies may appear to remove support for this theory but we then have to consider who is making the criticism and their standing within the German command at the time. A officer who was well liked by the upper command would have less fear of writing down their criticisms while someone who was out of favor or just returning to favor might say or think something but never write it down and be very careful who they included in their thoughts.
Germany lost the war because they didnt have the speed of a fully mechanized force like america had at the time. Its really quite simple.
The imperial german army and america had the best armed forces the planet has ever known. When germany and america clashed in WW1 nothing of the sort has ever been seen in warfare before or since.
Macksey preface in "Guderian Creator of the Blitzkrieg" describes Guderians narrative shortcomings in light of what the circumstances were during "Erinnerungen eines Soldaten" writing. Macksey sources are also impressive Guderian himself, multiple German generals and officials, war diaries and letters, family, documents and photos from Bundesarchiv ect. So even if it's not without errors I trust it more than debate and retrospective analysis done generations later.
In hoi 3 I assigned Guderian to a pure infantry division… a waste but…
Currently reading Panzer Leader, thanks for the extended context!
Guderian had a lot to answer for. Hitler supposedly told Guderian he had cold feet about Kursk, but we only have Guderian's word for for that, and his supposed advice to call off the offensive. Guderian also favored holding the panzer divisions back from the French coast for a massive counterattack – in the face of overwhelming Allied air power.
Much better than Rommel Video, although have to admit it had a point it was not what I was interested in. How about doing something on Rommel that looks at him as a leader.
Hey! Do you play HOI4?
Just admit Guderian was a lair. He grossly misleads the reader in his memoirs and was literally a war criminal. Also I doubt his memory would change that much. Self-aggrandizement is a form of lying and if everything in your memoir promotes yourself than it is not true and a lack of empathy for the work of others is irrelevant given the scale and leadership required to be a general of his status
Und Erian.. Eritrea
Yes, I'm a Guderian fanboy ! Some are fanboys of katanas, others for throwing pommels, more are fanboys of Kim K colossal ass and other for Justin Bieber. I think I have the upper hand 🙂
Only hienz a german commander who are not did war crimes…he is great!
Academic, very interesting. “I know some thing.” Sargent Sholltz brother.
I am the man and you know it!
Schneller Heinz/Fast Heinz
This General Beck seems to have had the right attitude towards building an army. It does make Gudarian seem to be a total liar.
Yes, I can actually admit that I made a fatal decision that lead to the death of one person. I have to live with it. But war cracks and silences people that are true to themselves, only people that have strong psychological repression capability or unempatic persons can make wars a beautiful exciting saga.
I would consider him and Rommel plus Walter Model
Edit: Don't listen to American and British propaganda totally, they are very baised
Here's a "myth" I wish somebody would tackle: RANGING MACHINE GUNS.
This was not the function of a coaxial MG, correct?
Guderian wrote his Memories when he was one of the only Generals of High-Command who had survived and was not on trial for war crimes, this gives "color" to what is written in times of rearming
I thought Panzer Leader to be like the original title, recollection about an experience. I thought it much more crucial to see how it was that Guderian thought, than what he did. Reading Panzer Leader for the first time ages ago I realized that he wasn't the myth television made him to be (and yknow I've not seen a single full length documentary about him). I reckoned if people came to that idea that it was from Achtung Panzer! or residual hype from the period. Always thought Panzer Leader to be way more about personalities than strategy or ideas; which perhaps is part of reconciling the past as memoirs oft do. When strategy was discussed it seemed rather generalized.
Loved the way you summarized there at the end, I think those are solid metrics for an individual's literary account vs a historical record. (Not directly addressing your video here, which are much appreciated and unparalleled in comprehensiveness, but touching on some of the general themes)
I am reading panzer leader right now. The most important thing this video taught me – take his memories with a grain of salt. I thank you for that
I named my cat after Guderian. And have Panzer Leader by my bed (actually just got it out of bookcase). Shattered. Although he is still significant.
I see a lot of stuff from commenters about Moscow blah blah blah but don’t you guys realize Moscow was a target for its geographic and strategic capabilities?
Moscow was a major city on the Eastern Front and as such had major capabilities. It’s control was also pivotal to controlling the Moskva and its banks in the local region. It was Hitler who wanted to try the inane envelopment of Moscow, contrary to his generals who wished to combine their panzer divisions in a frontal push for the city and clearing it to the banks afterwards for Winter.
Nobody believed that the USSR would just magically tip over in 1941 after taking Moscow.
The target for Barbarossa and its end goal was the Arkhangelsk-Astrakhan line. It was wildly optimistic-simple math shows the Germans would have needed to advance insane amounts of land just to reach their goals before Winter-but it was a lot more sensible than the German command all drooling over Moscow thinking it would just collapse the USSR.
Could it have? Maybe, but likely not. Moscow would have had a big impact on the troops and maybe economy, but the government and command of the Eastern Front would remain largely unchanged unless the economy of the USSR fell into collapse as has been theorized. However due to lend-lease, I wouldn’t consider the economy of the USSR at risk in the event of Moscow falling.
I think the completion of the Siege of Leningrad and the completion of the original plan to take Moscow would have had a far better impact on the German frontline and forces than if the miracle-encirclement attempted in reality had occurred.
I am reading his book, a great man.
Unfortunate that there is no Wikipedia page of guderien.
Bernard Montgomery
is better
I love reading war memoirs because it adds perspective to things. But humans are not infallible and like you said in the video. People are more inclined to justify themselves than to admit to making mistakes. Which is why memoirs need to be taken within the context of other available sources. If you want to learn about the Western Front in WWII, you don't just read Eisenhowers memoirs. You read those of Bradley, Montgomery, Abrams, Horrocks, then you find some memoirs written by soldiers who were on the ground doing the actual fighting. Then you take all of this information and compare it to information stored in the various national archives around the world. The only way we can ever get a complete picture of history is to examine things from all sides.
Liddell Hart wrote the introduction to "Panzer Leader" and was exceptionally clear that Guderian was prone to self aggrandisement. Mass troop tactics used during WWI are evidence of the slow adoption of new methods by the military elites. The early chapters of Guderian's "Panzer Leader" were more informative of the reluctance of the high command to adopt new strategy, intermingled with his personal role. The initial stages of the attack on France saw light and medium tanks in the German army overwhelm heavy tanks in the French army and BEF, neutralised because they insisted upon using them as infantry support. Guderian made it all about himself but there is little doubt that his strategic concept was correct. Also Guderian was quite explicit about communication and command turrets that he insisted were a requirement of tank battalions. This video presented evidence that other military minds recognised the benefit of a tank battalion but not the specific communication ability of the tank. Guderian made a fairly clear case that tank innovation and tactical manoeuvrability during those years were within his purview.
You can stay away from memoir if you like, I will certainly not. It's valuable to get someone's point of view even if it's wrong.
I like
Memoirs as it tells how someone looks upon events in their life, it does not mean take everything they say as fact.
can you please do a video on Manstein and Kesselring
Hey Guderian want some vodka party later?
Manstain(this i spell his name right)is Hitler
Resources put into tanks from 1933-1939 4.1%. Basically nothing at all. If the very conservative and stodgy people like Halder and Beck were secretly so receptive to the idea of armor being so important then why did tanks get the very least support out of every category? Each Bismarck class battleship's materials could have been used to make 1,000 Tiger tanks or twice as many Panzer IVs. Each year 186,000 tons of iron was being used to construct autobahns and monuments all through the war. Enough to build almost the entire historical run of Panzer IVs at a blow. Germany produced 4x the total steel the soviet union did, and didn't even make half as many tanks. By contrast 1/4 of the steel production for arms went to anti aircraft guns of questionable use.
Panzer I was always considered a training tank stopgap. General Beck was an ultraconservative nutjob who actually WANTED to start a war world war, unlike most generals and even nazi party leaders who hoped to avoid a big war or possibly even any kind of war at all. He just wanted to build up a huge army first over a long period. Which even if you did want a war, would never work because England and France and Russia would all do the same. Beck and other generals may also have moderated their views over time. Guderian did get many of the things he wanted eventually but he certainly did not get them all and he certainly got very low amount of support in terms of materials. They did not even really get self propelled guns at all until after France for god's sake. Now if it were the case it was so hard to do these things then it would be one thing, but it was not. It was just dead last on the priority list and one of the big factors in why they lost the war in the soviet union.
Guys like Guderian also had very little say about the way the army was run before the success of France. He was considered a radical along with von Manstein and many other of the younger generals. It was also only after this that the propaganda about german tanks and motorization started blasting all over the place nonstop.
What did von Seeckt for example really do for panzer corps? Nothing at all. Guderian was directly involved with this. None of the doctrines were new those existed since the times of Prussia. No one at the time realized yet what a profound effect tanks would have on the accomplishment of those doctrines. They were not made up by von Seeckt nor were they in place with a special eye towards tanks. If anyone does deserve credit for the mostly unexpected success of the sickle cut it's Guderian. He put together the idea of the infantry supporting the tanks and being mobilized, and having mobile artillery and all of it moving together in a combined arms unit. And that is what made the 'blitzkreig' possible.
If there's any myth it's the idea there is some magic 'panzer doctrine' that came about and revolutionized war. When did this come out and from who? Well, it didn't, it's bullshit. All the ideas that made tanks successful already central to the German warfare system before Guderian was even born. Combined arms group is the magic part that was missing to make this effective on such a grand scale, and no one is more directly responsible for that than Guderian.
And how many papers do you have to write to be an expert programmer for example? Well, none. The more papers you have written the less likely it is you are one. What constitutes being an expert? Well if you are training even with mockups as the Germans did before they had new tanks then I would think that whoever did so might be construed an expert for his time. You know, like Guderian.
Kursk – everyone and their uncle knew Kursk was a bad idea. Or rather it was a bad idea once Hitler forced them to wait a long time before execution and allowed them to prepare lots of defenses. Since Kursk is little to do with Guderian then of course there will not be much record of his opinion.
There may be something to the idea of not swallowing memoirs without a grain of salt but I've never even read his memoirs and still can't see how anything this video has said can be supported.
Nice Video. Aber das Symbol "Alleged Enemies" kann ich nicht entziffern^^
In all of your opinions who is the most underrated general
İf fucking shitler left he was going to conquer russia just with tank 😢 R. I. P Heinz Guderian
i herd that argument from Turks who claims that Mustafa Kamal where a military leader on high as Rommel, and read his self biography, and use that as the 100% Truth
Supply lines the issue.
Hasn't changed my opinion one bit on the father of modern tank warfare and, in my opinion, the greatest military general of all time. Guderian, Rommel, Von Manstein we're all way ahead of their time. Long live Der Vaterland!
Any historian with a passing knowledge of military tactics would acknowledge Guderian as a leading strategist and originator of warfare methods that were completely new and untried in history. By virtue of his strong personality and knowledge he changed the German war machine into a truly effective fighting machine on the precipice of European and possibly world domination. The orchestrated coordination of air, artillary, tank battlions and the lowly foot soldier to achieve a military goal were largely tactics studied, refined and attenuated by Guderian. He is also one of very few generals that engaged in shouting matches with Adolf Hitler and lived to persevere . He had no real loyalty to Hitler's view of the Arian state but in the end he was a soldier and died a soldier.
I agree in general.. ( pun noted) A clue is in his book.. one will note a number of Good Panzer officers suddenly appearing ….. But all witnesses are suspect. History often has only witnesses for information so one has to weight their statements. I do like that you have considered the biological reasons our memories are not accurate. Everyone has an ego… generals and politicians have really big ones.
Too much text.
In reality what could the panzers I & II do that armoured cars couldn't do as well and have better mobility ?
Guderian certainly had his run ins with his superior officer Hans Von Kluge in Operation Barbarossa being the egomanic that he was. In 1940 Guderian's command of 2 panzer divisions against the low countries and France were quite good of which were executed in Blitzkrieg fashion.
Guderian apparently knew the limitations of the German panzers and was more keen on mobility and striking power as compared to the heavier Tigers which were ponderously slow and too heavy to cross some bridges.
Is there a Video like this about Manstein as well?
Was a nice time back then
I like the video, i think it was well thought out and presented fairly (mostly)
here are a few issues I have with it. Guderian, Did rub quite a few High ranking officials the wrong way. When Hitler took power he was seen as "A ROCK STAR" by most of the German people (notice I said MOST) when Hitler decided that he was going to build up the German Military many of the German Generals/officers had some hesitations, because they remembered WW1, but when Hitler annexed Austria, the GB and France did nothing, When he re-entered the Rhineland and GB and France did nothing, Then he annexed the Sudeten Lands, and GB and France did nothing, then He Tore up the Treaty of Versailles and GB and France did nothing, suddenly ALL of the German High Command wanted to snuggle up to Hitlers nut sack, because at that point the German people (again most) saw Hitler as GOD, so Here comes Guderian and he publishes his book and suddenly people are taking notice of him, and Hitler is liking what he is reading about Tanks, and Wants Germany to have a tank army. Well this is going to be an issue if you are a German General and here is this German Colonel getting a bunch of praise and attention, so what are German Generals going to do? Well it is quite probably that they are going to fall into 1 of 2 categories, Those who try and slander Guderian, and those who see him as a rising star and try to hitch their wagon to his horse. Which is why you could say that Guderian "Made some Enemies" and he
"Made some Allies" within the German High Command. We can not JUST TAKE Guderians memoirs with a grain of salt, we need to take EVERYONES memoirs with a grain of salt, because just as people often times will exaggerate Their accomplishments, they will also minimize the accomplishments of others so that they seem to get most of the credit (or others get most of the blame)
When it comes to WW2, most people who have really spent time studying WW2, will recognize that the Germans had some of the best military minds not only in WW2 but in history, and Guderian has his place among them. Rommel, Patton, Guderian, Montgomery. I am not going to add Zhukov or Konev (because they were referred to as "The Butcherers" by their own men because the lives of the soldiers seemed to mean little if anything to Zhukov and Konev, (were they quality leaders?) Yes, but on the same level as Rommel.Guderian/Patton/Montgomery? NO.
Modern Tank Warfare was shaped (in large part) due to Heinz Guderian, case closed.
Funny, Billy Mitchell painted himself as the exact same martyred genius when he got drummed out of the Army Air Corps (for basically being a colossal asshole).
And for a long time the pioneers of naval aviation in the US Navy were viewed the same way – hidebound "battleship admirals" resisted anything that might challenge their preferred warship type.
Seems we like the idea of tortured geniuses struggling against a hostile bureaucracy…
All primary sources have value. I would not avoid the memoir, just be mindful of how best to use it.
good video.
But you can't deny the fact that he's the father of modern armoured warfare
Can you do a video on Manstien soon please??
High stake losers should be allowed to rip
Guderian's interest in the war was regaining his family estates in Poland. After that he was against further actions.
dumb
hermaneutics employed: everything is unreliable
MHV: Well made sir! The honest and frank organization of your thoughts is, as usual, excellent.
Guderian was one of Germany's finest commanders, but not an armored strategical and tactical genius.
Put another way, if Patton was in Guderian's place…well, let's just say it was fortunate for the Allies that Patton didn't wear Wehrmacht grey!
Keep up the good work!
OMGoodness!!!! I loved this. I read Achturng! Panzer when I was 12 years old. Heinz Guderian was a name that I had learned playing wargames in the late 60's I enjoyed the book; but, one could tell it was a concept book. And Panzer Leader was a personal account of his struggles. One could see that he was the Hero of his story. Lol, he didn't like staff work. You mentioned General Beck; his idea of building panzer brigades was more about command and control of the units and rather than opposition to paner divisions. He thought that they could motorize the support units in the brigade to keep up with the armor; but, that it could be done in smaller chunks over time. Guderian sees to have been the all or nothing kind of guy. And perhaps??? that is why he felt he was fighting uphill. I donno.
What a great accent, what type of German is that?
Guderian war ein äuserst Geldgeiler Mensch.
I agree. I first read both of Guderian's books as a teenager then again about 45 years later. My evaluation had changed too. I also agree on one's memory not being efficient. But I confess over the years I've come to wonder if " Blitzkrieg" was more a discovery learned, than a theory put into practice. ??
absolute madlad
The only part I disagreed with Guderian was where he claimed that Tolstoy’s house at Jasnaja Poljana was left in untouched while in fact it was demolished either by units under Guderians command or by other german units.
Great video as usual and on a topic that needs to be addressed. If you could do a review on Manstein and his "Lost Victories", that would be ideal!
Military commanders are greedy for popularity and to become praised. Guderian is not the only one. Think about Patton and his fanboys. More careful study and you will soon notice that he too was no way any kind of military genius at all.
In English you would emphasise the war in Second World War, not world. It sounds so odd and out of place to hear it differently
When I lived in Fresno, California, which is an area populated by Armenian descendants, there was a somewhat joking speculation going around, given the general's surname, if he was of Armenian heritage?
Nothing wrong in reading memoirs – like most historians – they have to decide what to leave in – what to leave out.
World Conquerer 4 anyone?
Most of the things you say about me are true 😀
Could you imagine if Heinz Guderian kept advancing his Panzer divisions to Moscow. The world could be different…
What amazes me is that the US Army too Guderian and all his buddies' ideas at face value too. They came to idolize the Wehrmacht staff structure and doctrines. Yet despite all that, the US Army staff structure is one of the most cumbersome and inefficient military staff structures in the world, ignoring (for better or worse) everything they strove to imitate.
I don’t agree with your comments about Kursk. Guderian clearly advocates Gen. Walther Model, stating the offensive should have been done 8 months before when the protrusion was not well noticed by red army and less fortified.
Since I was a boy I've always thought that Guderian was a really cool name for a Panzer General.
Do a book on Albert Kesselring.
I think Guderian is overrated by the virtue of fact that his views have been taken at its face value (the same as mentioned in this presentation) which does not quite reconcile with the actual facts. Not to mention, he was quite good at smear campaigns (as can be seen from his treatment of Ludwig Beck).
Other details I like to nit-pick on Guderian involves changing Guderian's 2nd Panzer Group from the Moscow Axis to east of Kiev during August-September 1941. His disregard for Soviet defenders strung along the southern flank of the Army Group Center seems particularly questionable for me. Did he genuinely believe that the Soviets would crumble so easily? Due to the overextended German logistics and Soviet counterattacks, he could not have proceeded to Moscow in August-September 1941. So, was he bullshitting with making such an absurd claim?
At 11:26 I think you meant "Settling old Feuds? "
Maybe this case should be closed as he was a man who wrote what he wanted, not aiming to be accountable.
Speaking of the book, "Panzer Leader", what do you comment regarding his remarks regarding:
a) Panther tank is the "problem-child" of the Panzerwaffe
b) belated production of the Jagdpanzer 38 Hetzer undermines the anti-tank capabilities of the infantry units in the Eastern Front.
Take Care and excellent videos.
Very balanced and fair account MHV. One problem of course with Anglophone histories of the topic and period is the limited German language skills of the majority of British and US historians hampering their ability to mine the German archives. I will say though that you were quite soft on Liddell Hart. A lot of the early post-war myths about German generalship, tank warfare etc springs from Liddell Hart's writings. Some of the captive Generals, Guderian included, 'played' Liddell Hart by proclaiming, during interviews with the British historian, his great influence on them in the inter-war period, resulting in glowing reports from this most vain man on their genius and influence. Liddell Hart talked up the 'lonely genius's fighting the ignorant authorities' narrative that Guderian peddles as he saw himself in that mold too.
Why is there no video about Karl Gerd Von Rundstedt?
Been enjoying your videos. You are humble and introspective. Rare qualities on Youtube and in the classroom. Respect! you even cursed.
Guderian remembered what he wanted to remember.F.e. during the attack on Poland in 1939 Septemeber 1-4 , in spot called Wizna, he unsuccesfully tried to break through Polish army resistance for 4 days , losing numerous tanks and soldiers.
He used local residents as human shield to make the defenders to capitulatete.
Guderian of course forgot to mention that , however the participants of this battle did not and that fact apperars in too many memoirs as an act of unnnecessar unhuman brutality and barbarism
There is a video game franchise called World Conqueror where you play mostly during WW2. In the fourth and most recent installment, World Conqueror 4, both Guderian and Manstein are playable, along other characters.
Was not that good got well and truly beat if memory serves
Outstanding commentary on memory recollection. I can attest to this as an F18 flyer from 20 years ago, I was stunned to see how much I couldn't remember or flat out got wrong recollecting when I touched based with current F18 flyers. Well said. Your videos are very well done and are at the highest academic caliber. Great stuff keep it up! Looking forward to disgesting all your videos in the coming months!
Gudari akiyama is my spirit animal
It doesn't matter the man in charge was a nut
WOW!!! MUSEUM & MEMORIAL FOR WORLD MEMORY!!! COOL & FANTASTIC!!!
A missing aspect to Kursk: You should have interviewed Rochus Misch, he was in the Conference when Hitler argued About the Attack @Kursk. How do i know. Well a friend of mine German Historician interviewed Rochus Misch and asked About this and that. There he told him that Guderian asked Hitler: Mein Führer, was meinen Sie wie viele Menschen in Deutschland Kursk kennen ? Warum greifen wir überhaupt an ? Warum verbleiben wir nicht im Jahr 1943 in eine Verteidigungshaltung im Osten und Starten eine Offensive im nächsten Jahr ? Hitler antwortet: Ja ich weiß Sie haben ja recht und wenn ich an den Angriff denke dann dreht sich mir der Magen um, aber ich kann nicht anders. This you can´t find in many Books because no one Interviewed People who were @ the Confrerences (Lagebesprechung) because they were already dead or they forgot even to ask also the Little men who might have heard something.
I did research years ago, discussed on Axis History Forum a few times. We found that most of Guderian's ideas were actually just stolen intellectual property of Ernst Volckheim.
Of course Gen Guderian was not the father of blitzkrieg..the idea of combining forces to catch enemy's flank is not something new. this theory was practiced since the age of alexander of Macedonia.in fact that is the reason why alexander's army able to gain victory after victory in his campaign.but what Guderian had came up was the idea of concentration of the armour group at one attack point.but to flank an enemy is not an easy task..especially when the commanders are well informed.by the way good video!
Heinz the REAL MVP.
guderian → the greatest general ever…
What peaple dont realize is that anyway there are no source of materials so that we can make a critic, we become victim of the myth of Guderian in the sense that we cannot trascend his memories whit mere talking and they become at he very end a primary source of his story. Here the myth fuses whit history and its up to us to make any final consideration. Still a lot of peaple forgot about the fact that those are the memory of a man, not a story report whit a lot of honorable mentions (that still Guderin had done in his books)..or maybe they forgot that Guderian was the only person that was able to stood up and was allowed to stand in front of Hitler… yes I believe (whitout forgot others like Major Lutz) in the myth of Guderian.
Manstein, Guderian and Rommel. The best the Wehrmacht had to offer. Had they been given full authority they would have won the war.
This makes very interesting listening especially around writers motivations and viewpoints. Thanks!